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INHERITING INTERNATIONAL RIVERS: STATE
SUCCESSION TO TERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS,
SOUTH SUDAN, AND THE 1959 NILE WATERS AGREEMENT†
Mohamed S. Helal∗
ABSTRACT
South Sudan’s independence has increased the number of Nile riparian
states to eleven. Unfortunately, the Nile remains without an all-inclusive legal
regime to regulate its use and to ensure that this indispensable natural
resource is conserved for future generations. What, therefore, are the legal
obligations of the newborn Republic of South Sudan regarding the Nile River?
Specifically, this Article asks whether the Egyptian-Sudanese Nile Waters
Agreement of 1959 has devolved onto South Sudan. This Article looks to the
law of state succession to treaties to answer to this question. This is a field of
international law that is beset with considerable uncertainty. State practice is
inconsistent and scholarly opinion is virtually unanimous that the principal
international legal instrument on the matter, the 1978 Convention on State
Succession in Respect of Treaties, does not wholly reflect customary
international law. To further complicate matters, the process by which South
Sudan gained independence makes it difficult to reconcile this case with the
structure and logic of the 1978 Convention. Therefore, this Article turns to
customary international law to determine the rights and obligations of South
Sudan in relation to the Nile River. This Article argues that international law
recognizes a special category of treaties that establish territorial obligations.
The overwhelming weight of state practice and judicial opinion supports the
assertion that these territorial obligations remain unaffected by State
† With much gratitude, this Article is dedicated to my academic supervisors at Harvard University:
Professor William Alford, Professor Gabriella Blum, and Professor John Gerard Ruggie. The author wishes to
thank Jason Robison, Konstantinos Stylianou, and Abdelkhalig Shaib for reading drafts of this Article and
providing insightful comments and suggestions. All errors are mine alone.
∗ S.J.D. Candidate (Harvard Law School); LL.M. ’10 (Harvard Law School); Licence en droit ’09 (Ain
Shams Law Faculty, Egypt); M.A. in International Human Rights Law ’04 (American University in Cairo);
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the positions of the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt.
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succession. This Article concludes that, while it is doubtful that South Sudan
has succeeded to the 1959 Nile Water Treaty per se, the Nile’s newest riparian
is bound by the territorial obligations enshrined therein. This, however, is an
unsatisfactory state of affairs. The existing treaties relating to the Nile River
are inadequate to meet the many environmental, demographic, and
developmental challenges facing the drainage basin. The Nile riparians need
to overcome their differences and reach agreement on a comprehensive legal
regime to govern the utilization of the watercourse.
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INTRODUCTION
On July 9, 2011, South Sudan declared independence from the Republic of
the Sudan and became the world’s newest state.1 South Sudan also became the
eleventh riparian state to share the world’s longest river, the Nile.2 Emerging
from Africa’s longest civil war, South Sudan faces immeasurable challenges as
it strives to lay the foundations of a peaceful and prosperous nation.3 In
addition to boundary disputes with its northern neighbor, conflicts over the use
and exploitation of its abundant natural resources, particularly oil and water,
could become a serious source of insecurity for the young republic.4 Most
scholarly and policy interest has centered on the potential for the outbreak of
hostilities between Sudan and South Sudan over oil-related disputes.5
Relatively lesser attention has been paid to the impact the birth of South Sudan
has had on the Nile Basin legal regime.
The Nile is an ancient river. Since time immemorial, glorious civilizations
flourished on its banks and lived off its silt.6 “The Nile is one of the great
natural wonders of the world. . . . It flows through every natural formation
from towering mountains and well-watered highlands to the most barren of
deserts.”7 Today, the Nile continues to provide sustenance to millions of
people in its eleven riparian states.8 Unfortunately, South Sudan entered
international life at a time of uncertainty for the Nile. As discussed in Part II of
1

See, e.g., South Sudan’s Flag Raised at Independence Ceremony, BBC NEWS (July 9, 2011), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14092375.
2 The Nile riparian States are: Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Kenya, South Sudan, Sudan, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda.. See Christina Carroll, Past and Future Legal
Framework of the Nile River Basin, 12 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 269, 270, 273 (1999).
3 See Crisis Group Africa, Int’l Crisis Group, Politics and Transition in the New South Sudan, at 1–2,
Africa Report No.172 (Apr. 4, 2011).
4 See Crisis Group Africa, Int’l Crisis Group, Sudan: Defining the North-South Border, at 1–2, 8, Policy
Briefing No.75 (Sept. 2, 2010).
5 Luke Patey, Crude Days Ahead? Oil and the Resource Curse in Sudan, 109 AFR. AFF., 617, 617
(2010); TED DAGNE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN AND CHALLENGES FOR
AFRICA’S NEWEST NATION 18 (2011), available at http://relooney.fatcow.com/SI_FAO-Africa-2012/Sudan_1.
pdf; Josh Kron, In 2 Sudans, Familiarity with Path to War, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2012, at A4. It should be
noted, however, that scholars have pointed to the potential for the outbreak of war over water between Nile
riparian States. See, e.g., Joyce Starr, Water Wars, FOREIGN POLICY (Spring 1991) at 17.
6 R.O. Collins, History, Hydropolitics, and the Nile: Nile Control: Myth or Reality, in The NILE:
SHARING A SCARCE RESOURCE 109, 110 (P.P. Howell & J.A. Allan eds., 1994)
7 Id.
8 In 2005, the UN Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) estimated that the total population of the
Nile Basin to be 201 million and projected that this figure will increase to 336 million by 2030. See U.N. FOOD
& AGRIC. ORG., POPULATION PROSPECTS IN THE NILE BASIN (2005), available at http://www.fao.org/nr/water/
faonile/products/Docs/Poster_Maps/POPULATIONBIG.pdf.
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this Article, the Nile riparian States have failed to agree on a comprehensive
legal framework for the utilization and conservation of the river’s resources.
This has left the Nile with a fragmented legal regime comprised of antiquated
treaties contracted during the colonial era and a series of post-colonial
agreements, none of which include all riparian states.
Prior to the independence of South Sudan, the use of the Nile waters by
Sudan was regulated by a number of international treaties and basin-wide
cooperative arrangements.9 The most prominent of these is the Nile Waters
Agreement concluded between Egypt and Sudan in 1959.10 The birth of South
Sudan and the absence of an overarching legal regime regulating the use of the
Nile waters raises questions about the scope and content of the legal rights and
obligations of this new state in relation to the Nile River. Specifically, this
Article examines whether South Sudan has inherited the legal obligations of its
parent state, Sudan, enshrined in the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement.
Examining the status of the 1959 Agreement is a question that intersects
multiple areas of international law and environmental policy that are mired by
varying degrees of uncertainty, indeterminacy, and complexity. These areas
principally include the law of state succession, which suffers doctrinal
uncertainty and confusion;11 international fluvial law, which lacks a coherent
set of customary rules to govern the utilization of international watercourses;12

9 See generally P. Howell, East Africa’s Water Requirements: The Equatorial Nile Project and the Nile
Waters Agreement of 1929. A Brief Historical Review, in The NILE, supra note 6, at 81.
10 Id. at 97.
11 Robert Jennings commented that:

[T]he law of State succession . . . is a subject which presents such a rich diversity of practice as to
give some plausibility to a surprisingly varied range of theoretical analysis and doctrine: so much
so that some of the most helpful writers have preferred to abandon general theory and have
employed instead an attempt to lay down rules for particular kinds of cases, thus distinguishing,
for example, between succession in matters of treaties, matters of contract, matters of tort, and so
on, as well as between different occasions: but even so the rules are not above doubt and
controversy, for practice is frequently ambiguous.
R.Y. Jennings, General Course on International Law, 121 RECUEIL DES COURS 437, 437 (1967) (citations
omitted).
12 Charles Bourne, The Primacy of the Principle of Equitable Utilization in the 1997 Watercourses
Convention, 1997 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 215, 215–16 (commenting that it is “impossible to assert with assurance
that there was any customary international law governing international water resources . . . .”). For an
overview of the historical development of international fluvial law, see generally Ludwik A. Teclaff, Fiat or
Custom: The Checkered Development of International Water Law, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 45 (1991).
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and the field of sustainable water resource management, the complexity of
which continues to bedevil experts.13
In this Article, I argue that South Sudan has inherited the territorial
obligations enshrined in the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement. This conclusion is
based on the claim that legal obligations of a territorial nature, such as those
relating to the use of international watercourses, are recognized by customary
international law as being unaffected by the succession of states. This,
however, is no cause for comfort. The Nile River remains without a holistic
all-inclusive legal framework to regulate its use, exploitation, and
conservation. This situation is untenable. The Nile riparians need to overcome
their differences and agree on a legal and institutional regime that enables them
to collectively overcome the many environmental, economic, and
developmental challenges facing the Nile drainage basin.
There is more to this Article, however, than the specific case study of South
Sudan’s succession to the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement. The birth of new
nations is a matter of great political import and entails immense legal
ramifications. As discussed in Part III, once admitted to the family of nations,
the law of state succession determines the rights and obligations of new states.
Having wrested their independence either from colonial masters or oppressive
regimes, many new nations have claimed a right to be freed from obligations
contracted on their behalf. Maintaining a degree of stability in global affairs,
however, requires preserving confidence in international legal transactions and
predictability in the relations among nations.
State succession is the field of law that attempts to strike politically
sensible and jurisprudentially sound compromises between these clashing
interests. Despite its importance, however, state succession is an unfortunate
field of international law. For years, monographs on state succession would
languish on law library shelves as a testament to a bygone era. Then, suddenly,
the tumults of global politics would thrust state succession to the center of
policy debates and to the top of the academic agenda. The independence of
South Sudan is the latest, but certainly not the last, case of state creation that
raises questions of state succession. There are many more candidates for

13 See SHAFIQUL ISLAM & LAWRENCE SUSSKIND, WATER DIPLOMACY: A NEGOTIATED APPROACH
MANAGING COMPLEX WATER NETWORKS 7–8 (2012).

TO
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statehood.14 This makes the law of state succession an always-opportune topic
for academic consideration.
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I briefly describes the process
leading to the secession of South Sudan. Part II surveys the legal regime and
institutional frameworks governing the utilization of the Nile River. This
begins with an examination of the treaties concluded during the colonial era,
followed by a description of the political background and content of the 1959
Nile Waters Agreement, and a brief exposé of the treaties and cooperative
frameworks that have since been established to regulate the use of the Nile
River.
Part III focuses on the law of state succession. First, this part defines State
succession, and then briefly discusses and critically examines the main
doctrines of State succession developed by jurists. Second, this part examines
the 1978 Vienna Convention on State Succession in Respect of Treaties, which
is the principal international instrument that purports to codify the applicable
law in situations of the creation of new States. Particular emphasis will be
placed on discerning where South Sudan falls in the general scheme of this
convention. Part IV surveys the doctrine underlying the claim that treaties
creating territorial obligations are immunized against the effects of State
succession, and then reviews the travaux préparatoires of the 1978 Convention
and subsequent practice to determine whether customary international law has
recognized territorial obligations as surviving State succession. Finally, Part IV
identifies the rights and obligations inherited by South Sudan in relation to the
Nile River.
I. THE BIRTH OF SOUTH SUDAN
On July 20, 2002, the Government of Sudan signed the Machakos Protocol
with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).15 This was the first of
a series of agreements that were ultimately combined into a Comprehensive
14 One scholar has identified the following territories vying for independence: Nagorno-Karabakh
(Azerbaijan), Flanders (Belgium), Republika Srpska (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Quebec (Canada), Tibet
(China), Xinjiang (China), Abkhazia (Georgia), South Ossetia (Georgia), Ache (Indonesia), Kurdistan (Iraq),
Transdniestria (Moldova/Russia), Palestinian Territories, Moro Region (Philippines), Chechnya (Russia),
Somaliland (Somalia), Basque (Spain), Tamil Region (Sri Lanka), and Taiwan. Brian Beary, Separatist
Movements: Should Nations Have the Right to Self-Determination? 2 CQ GLOBAL RESEARCHER 87, 89–90
(2007). See Graeme Wood, Limbo World: They Start Acting like Real Countries, Then Hope to Become Them,
FOREIGN POLICY, (Jan./Feb. 2010) at 48, for a more “lighthearted” account of life in similar territories.
15 The Machakos Protcol, 2003–2004 Y.B. ISLAMIC & MIDDLE E. L. 303.
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Peace Agreement (CPA), which was signed on January 9, 2005.16 In a
momentous achievement for the SPLM, the government of Sudan
acknowledged the right of the people of South Sudan to self-determination to
be exercised through a referendum in which they would choose between
remaining in a united Sudan or seceding to create an independent state.17 On
February 7, 2011, the South Sudan Referendum Commission announced that
almost ninety-nine percent of Southern Sudanese voted for secession.18 Five
months later, in a festive ceremony, South Sudan declared independence.19
Interestingly, despite including a Protocol on Wealth-Sharing, the CPA
disregarded the question of water management and the exploitation of the Nile
River resources.20 This protocol focused primarily on sharing the oil revenues,
in addition to provisions relating to land use, monetary and fiscal policy, and
tax revenues.21 The omission was not the result of a drafting error or a
negotiator’s oversight. The use and apportionment of the Nile waters has been
a source of controversy between the river’s riparians for many decades.22 The
political leadership of the SPLM sought to protect the hard-won
acknowledgment of their people’s right to self-determination against
intervention by other riparian states.23 “The birth of a new riparian would be
seen by some riparians as another complicating factor to the already complex
situation within the Nile Basin, and thus may not be welcomed by some of the

16 See Luka Biong Deng, The Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Will It Be Sustained?, in 7 CIVIL
WARS 244, 244 (2005), for an overview of the CPA and its major provisions. See DOUGLAS JOHNSON, THE
ROOT CAUSES OF SUDAN’S CIVIL WARS (2003); ANN LESCH, THE SUDAN: CONTESTED NATIONAL IDENTITIES
(1998), for a historical background on the civil war in the Sudan.
17 Article 1.3 of the Section titled “The Right to Self-Determination for the People of South Sudan” of
the Machakos Protocol states: “That the people of South Sudan have the right to self-determination, inter alia,
through referendum to determine their future status.” The Machakos Protocol, supra note 15, at 305. Article
2.5 of the same section then prescribes that:

At the end of the six (6) year Interim Period there shall be an internationally monitored
referendum, organized jointly by the GOS and the SPLM/A, for the people of South Sudan to:
confirm the unity of the Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established under the
Peace Agreement; or to vote for secession.
Id. at 306.
18 South Sudan Backs Independence—Results, BBC NEWS (Feb. 7, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-africa-12379431.
19 South Sudan’s Flag Raised at Independence Ceremony, supra note 1.
20 See Agreement on Wealth-Sharing, 2003–2004 Y.B. ISLAMIC & MIDDLE E. LAW 333.
21 Id. at 333–34, 341–42.
22 Salman M.A. Salman, Water Resources in the Sudan North-South Peace Process: Past Experience and
Future Trends, 2010 AFRICAN Y.B. INT’L LAW 299, 312 (2010).
23 Id. at 313.
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Nile riparians.”24 The 2005 Interim Constitution of South Sudan was
promulgated to incorporate the agreements reached in the CPA.25 In a further
indication of the SPLM’s desire to avoid engaging with questions relating to
the Nile River, this Interim Constitution entrusted the National Government in
Khartoum, as opposed to the provincial Government of Southern Sudan, with
the responsibility of administering the use of the Nile River resources.26
In short, the Government of Sudan and its partners in the SPLM shirked the
hard question of the apportionment and use of the Nile River. South Sudan will
not, however, be able to avoid this matter for long.27 As the fledgling new
nation looks to the Nile as an indispensable natural resource in its quest to
achieve sustainable development, it will inevitably need to consult with its coriparians, especially Sudan and Egypt, on waterworks that it plans to construct
on the watercourse.28
II. THE LEGAL REGULATION OF THE UTILIZATION OF THE NILE RIVER
WATERS
A full understanding of the content and significance of the 1959 Agreement
requires placing it within its historical context and viewing it as part of a
complex web of legal instruments regulating the use of the Nile waters. While
many of the instruments predating the 1959 Agreement were concluded when

24

Id.
See id. at 300.
26 See id. at 306.
27 A former U.S. envoy to the Sudan identified the use of the Nile waters as a potential cause for conflict
between the Sudan and South Sudan. See Andrew Natsios & Michael Abramowitz, Sudan’s Secession Crisis
Can the South Part From the North Without War?, 90 FOREIGN AFF. 19, 20–21 (2011).
28 As of this writing, the Government of South Sudan has not announced its intention to undertake major
waterworks. Also, it is unclear what the position of the Government of South Sudan is regarding the existing
legal framework of the Nile River. According to one source:
25

Regarding the role of Egypt, downstream to Sudan, GoSS [Government of South Sudan] officials
have assured their Egyptian counterparts that if the South [water use] becomes independent, they
would first review existing water usage with the North and operate within Sudan’s current
allocation of 25 per cent of the flow, thus not affecting the Egypt’s allocated flow. GoSS officials
have stated their commitment to preventing excessive loss of water but want Egypt to recognize
the development needs of Southern Sudan. Some Egyptian officials have expressed concern that
an independent Southern Sudan could join the East African states and then object to the standing
water sharing agreements.
JAKOB GRANIT ET AL., STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL WATER INSTITUTE, PAPER NO. 18, REGIONAL WATER
INTELLIGENCE REPORT: THE NILE BASIN AND THE SOUTHERN SUDAN REFERENDUM 11 (2010), available at
http://www.siwi.org/documents/Resources/Papers/Paper18_RWIR_Nile_Basin.pdf.
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most of the Nile riparians were under some form of colonial or foreign
domination, later agreements and cooperative mechanisms were established
after these countries gained independence from their metropolitan powers.29
This Part will first identify the pre-1959 legal instruments that relate to the use
of the Nile waters. Particular attention will be paid to the 1929 Nile Waters
Agreement since it represents the prelude to the 1959 Agreement. Next, this
Part will briefly recount the story of the political circumstances leading to the
conclusion of the 1959 Agreement, followed by a description of its contents.
Finally, an overview of the post-1959 agreements and regional cooperative
mechanisms will be presented, including attempts to reach a comprehensive
agreement between the Nile riparians on the use of the watercourse.
A. Pre-1959 Agreements on the Utilization of the Nile Waters
In the absence of a general legal instrument to which all Nile riparians are
party, we are left with a patchwork of treaties and understandings dating back
to the late 19th century. Unlike agreements concluded to regulate the use of
European watercourses, these treaties largely neglected the question of
navigation and focused almost solely on the non-navigational uses of the
river’s resources.30 As shown below, even a synoptic overview of these
instruments reveals that “[f]rom 1898 until the late 1940s attention on the
waters of the Nile focused almost entirely on the irrigation needs of Egypt and
the Sudan.”31 The reason for this was, and remains, simple. As two advisors of
the Egyptian Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation explained, “Egypt
depends on the Nile for its water, but its source lies outside of Egypt’s borders.
The Egyptian concerns with regard to the Nile are, therefore, both a matter of
national security and a life or death issue.”32 It is, therefore, unsurprising that

29

Lisa Jacobs, Comment, Sharing the Gifts of the Nile: Establishment of a Legal Regime for Nile Waters,
7 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L. J. 95, 105 (1993).
30 P.W. Tottenham, the Under-Secretary of State for Public Works in Egypt, was quoted as noting that,
“[t]he chief duty of the Nile and the first object of the canal system being the supply of water for agriculture,
the interests of navigation have to take second place, though every effort must be made to accommodate
them.” R.K. Batstone, The Utilisation of the Nile Waters, 8 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 523, 546 n.4 (1959). It is
noteworthy, however, that the first international legal instrument dealing with the utilization of the Nile
seemed to have been for the purpose of regulating navigation along the river. On October 12, 1841, the
Viceroy of Egypt issued a notification allowing for the construction of ships by foreigners for navigation along
the Nile and the Mahmoudie Canal. See Notification, on the Part of the Viceroy of Egypt, Relative to the
Building of Ships by Foreigners for the Navigation of the Nile and Mahmoudie Canal. Egypt, Oct. 12, 1841,
10 H.C.T. 602.
31 Howell, supra note 9, at 81.
32 Magdi Hefny & Salah El-din Amer, Egypt and the Nile Basin, 67 AQUAT.SCI. 42, 44 (2005).
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Egypt has always sought to either directly control or, at least, secure the
unrestricted flow of the Nile waters from the river’s headwaters in the
Abyssinian Highlands and the African Great Lakes region.33 This Egyptian
interest in guaranteeing unbridled access to the Nile waters was adopted by
Great Britain following its occupation of Egypt in 1882.34 In London’s
imperial eyes, Egypt’s Suez Canal was an indispensable thoroughfare to
Britain’s possessions in Asia, which necessitated maintaining stability in Egypt
and ensuring that no other European power was in a position to threaten
Britain’s presence in Egypt.35 Therefore, “[a]fter securing the headwaters of
the Nile in Kenya and Uganda and colonizing much of the Nile Valley, Great
Britain sought to negotiate treaties with other powers in the region in order to
ensure that other states would not change the flow of the Nile from points not
in its empire.”36
The first of these agreements was concluded between Great Britain and
Italy on April 15, 1891.37 The main purpose of the agreement was to demarcate

33 In an overview of relations between the Blue Nile riparians, and especially Egypt and Ethiopia, Daniel
Kendie noted that:

Egypt’s foreign policy has, to a significant degree, been shaped by the hydro-politics of the Nile
in general and the Blue Nile in particular. It is predicated upon the premise that Egypt should be
strong enough either to dominate Ethiopia, or to create the conditions to prevent the latter from
building dams on the Blue Nile.
Daniel Kendie, Egypt and the Hydro-Politics of the Blue Nile, 6 NORTHEAST AFR. STUD. NO. 1–2, 141, 151
(1999)
34 See Terje Tvedt, About the Importance of Studying the Modern History of the Countries of the Nile
Basin in a Nile Perspective, in THE RIVER NILE IN THE POST-COLONIAL AGE 1, 3 (Terje Tvedt ed. 2010).
Despite being under British occupation, Egypt remained legally a province of the Ottoman Empire until
Britain declared a protectorate over Egypt at the outbreak of World War I. See Nathan Brown, Law and
Imperialism: Egypt in Comparative Perspective, 29 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103, 103, 107 (1995).
35 While ostensibly responding to the threat of the breakdown of order in Egypt due to a revolt by a
group of Egyptian army officers, one of Britain’s primary aims in invading and occupying Egypt in 1882 was
the Suez Canal:
While the revolt of Arabi Pasha supplied the occasion for the British occupation, it was the Suez
Canal which furnished the motive. This was indicated when, in 1882, British forces in the name
of the Khedive seized the canal, landed troops, collected tolls and regulated canal traffic, with
fine disregard of protests of the officials of the canal company.
Halford Hoskins, The Suez Canal in Time of War, 14 FOREIGN AFF. 93, 96 (1935).
36 Carroll, supra note 2, at 276.
37 See Protocol Between the Governments of Great Britain and Italy for the Demarcation of their
Respective Spheres of Influence in Eastern Africa, Apr. 15, 1891, 2 CONSOL. T.S. 434; see also OFFICE OF
LEGAL AFFAIRS, LEGISLATIVE TEXTS AND TREATY PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE UTILIZATION OF
INTERNATIONAL RIVERS FOR OTHER PURPOSES THAN NAVIGATION, at 127, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/12, U.N.
Sales No. 63.V.4 (1963).
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the respective spheres of influence of the two countries in East Africa.38
Pursuant to Article III, the Italian Government undertook the following
obligation: “s’engage à ne construire sur l’Atbara en vue de l’irrigation,
aucun ouvrage qui pourrait sensiblement modifier sa défluence dans le Nil.”39
This agreement was followed by a series of agreements between the United
Kingdom and the upper Nile riparians.40 The first of these agreements was
signed with Ethiopia in Addis Ababa on May 15, 1902.41 The relevant
provision for the purposes of the utilization of the Nile waters appeared in
Article III, which stated:
His Majesty the Emperor Menelek II, King of Kings of Ethiopia,
engages himself towards the Government of His Britannic Majesty
not to construct, or allow to be constructed, any works across the
Blue Nile, Lake Tsana, or the Sobat which would arrest the flow of
their waters into the Nile except in agreement with His Britannic
42
Majesty’s Government and the Government of the Sudan.

Next, Great Britain concluded an agreement on May 9, 1906, with the
Government of the Independent State of the Congo which undertook not to
construct any waterworks on the Semiliki or Isango Rivers that would diminish
the flow of water into Lake Albert.43 Also in 1906, Great Britain, France, and
Italy issued a tripartite declaration in which the three Powers pledged to protect
“[t]he interests of Great Britain and Egypt in the Nile Basin, more especially as
38

Id.
“The Government of Italy undertakes not to construct on the Atabra any works for the purpose of
irrigation that might sensibly modify its flow into the Nile.” [Original in French, translation by the author]. Id.
at 128. This agreement was one of a series of agreements concluded by the colonial powers to delineate their
spheres of influence in various parts of Africa. For example, on October 29, 1886, July 2–8, 1887, and July 1,
1890, Great Britain and Germany signed agreements to identify their spheres of influence in East Africa and to
delimit the boundaries of the territories of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. See Agreement Between the British and
German Governments, Respecting Zanzibar and the Adjoining’ Territories; and Their Respective Spheres of
Influence in that Portion of the East African Continent, Gr. Brit.–Ger., Oct. 29, 1886, 17 H.C.T. 1174;
Agreement Between Great Britain and Germany, Respecting the Discouragement of Annexations in Rear of
Their Spheres of Influence in East Africa, Gr. Brit.–Ger., July 1887, 3 E. Hertslet et al., THE MAP OF AFRICA
BY TREATY 888; Agreement Between the British and German Governments, Respecting Africa and Helgoland,
Gr. Brit.–Ger., July 1, 1890, 3 E. Hertslet et al., THE MAP OF AFRICA BY TREAty 899. Likewise, Portugal and
Germany signed an agreement on December 30, 1886 to identify their spheres of influence in South-West and
South-East Africa. See Agreement Between the British and German Governments, Respecting Africa and
Helgoland, Gr. Brit.–Port., Dec. 30, 1886, 3 E. Hertslet et al., THE MAP OF AFRICA BY TREATY 703.
40 See OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, supra note 37, at 115–27.
41 Id. at 115.
42 Id.
43 Agreement Between Great Britain and the Independent State of the Congo, Modifying the Agreement
Signed at Brussels, 12th May, 1894, Gr. Brit.–Congo., May 9, 1906, 4 Consol. T.S. 2920. The treaty is also
reproduced in OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, supra note 37, at 99.
39
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regards the regulation of the waters of that river and its tributaries.”44 Then,
during the period of June–December 1925, Italy, acting on behalf of Eritrea,
and Great Britain, acting on behalf of the Sudan, exchanged notes to determine
the amount of water that would be diverted from the River Gash for irrigation
purposes in Eritrea.45
As Britain’s occupation of Egypt took on the semblances of a permanent
presence, and as London’s administrators in Cairo deepened their
understanding of the hydrology of the Nile Valley, it became evident that
Egypt’s irrigation network was inadequate for the continued growth of the
country’s economy, and therefore its political stability.46 This prompted British
and Egyptian authorities to commission a series of studies to examine the flow
of the Nile and to recommend measures to increase the river’s yield to allow
greater land reclamation in Egypt.47 The resulting studies eventually led to the
conclusion of the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement between Egypt and Great
Britain. Described as “the dominating feature of the legal relationships
concerning the distribution and utilisation of the Nile waters,”48 the 1929
Agreement is of particular importance for the purposes of this Article because
it represents the immediate antecedent to the 1959 Agreement and the
foundation upon which it is predicated.49 Therefore, the terms of the agreement
and the events leading to its conclusion will be outlined in greater detail.
The 1929 Agreement is the child of both the high drama of imperial
machinations and political assassination, and the relatively more mundane
technical, hydrological, and agricultural studies of the Nile Valley.50 Starting
with the latter, a commission of experts was appointed in 1920 to propose the
waterworks needed to support Egypt’s expanding agricultural sector.51 The
recommendations presented by these experts included the construction of a
series of dams along the Nile and a large reservoir in the Sudan. Cairo,
however, supported the idea of constructing a single dam within Egyptian

44 C.O. Okidi, Review of Treaties on Consumptive Utilization of Waters of Lake Victoria and Nile
Drainage System, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 161, 169 (1982).
45 OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, supra note 37, at 128‒31.
46 See Collins, supra note 6, at 111.
47 See Id. at 111–16.
48 Batstone, supra note 30, at 527.
49 Id. at 526–27.
50 See C.O. Okidi, History of the Nile and Lake Victoria Basins through Treaties, in The NILE, supra note
6, 321, 326–27 (P.P. Howell & J.A. Allan eds., 1994).
51 Id. at 326.
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territory.52 This was reflective of unease over the reality that not only would
Egypt’s entire existence be dependent on waters emanating from beyond its
borders, but also because:
Her sorry plight is made more acute by the fact that no possibility of
expansion is available without building reservoirs beyond her
frontiers. Manifestly such works may not be carried out unless the
neighboring power consent. It follows that, when all is said and done,
the future of Egypt depends upon the solution which will be given to
53
the question of the Sudan.

It, therefore, became apparent that the utilization of the Nile waters had
become inextricably entangled with the then-ongoing negotiations on the
independence of Egypt and the status of the Sudan, all of which were
intimately related to British imperial interests.54 Divergent views on these

52

Id.
Pierre Crabites, Egypt, The Sudan and The Nile, 3 FOREIGN AFF. 319, 325 (1924‒25).
54 In 1920, neither Egypt nor Sudan were independent states. See J.A. HAIL, BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY IN
EGYPT AND SUDAN 1947–1956, at 3–4 (1996). The former was a British protectorate from 1919 to 1922, while
the latter had been under a joint Egyptian-British Condominium from 1899 until Egypt’s presence in the Sudan
was abolished in 1925. See id. Egypt had erupted in a popular revolution in 1919 to demand the lifting of the
British protectorate and granting Egypt full independence. Id. at 5. As a result, London dispatched Lord Milner
to prepare a report on the most suitable form of government for Egypt. Id. at 6. The importance of Egypt and
Sudan to Britain’s interests were best expressed by Lord Balfour in the House of Commons when he stressed
that:
53

[T]he question of Egypt, the question of the Sudan and the question of the Canal, form an organic
and individual whole . . . . British supremacy is going to be maintained and let nobody either in
Egypt or out of Egypt make any mistake upon that cardinal principle of His Majesty’s
government.
Id. at 6. See generally M.W. DALY, EMPIRE ON THE NILE: THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN 1898‒1934 (1986);
Gabriel Warburg, The Sudan, Egypt and Britain 1899‒1916, 6 MIDDLE E. STUD. 163 (1970), for a discussion
on the status of Sudan and the evolution of the Egyptian-British Condominium.
Upon examining the situation in Egypt, the Milner Mission recommended the severance of the Sudan
from Egypt and reconstituting it as a separate political entity. The report did, however, include a caveat
relating to the Nile. It stated that a relationship between the two countries should be determined:
[U]pon a basis which will secure the independence of the Sudan while safeguarding the vital
interests of Egypt in the waters of the Nile . . . Egypt has an indefeasible right to an ample and
assured supply of water for the land at present under cultivation and to a fair share of any
increased supply which engineering skill may be able to provide.
Batstone, supra note 30, at 527.
Ultimately, the British protectorate was abolished and Egypt granted independence on February 28,
1922, albeit with four reservations that protected vital imperial interests. See Vernon A. O’Rourke, The British
Position in Egypt, 14 FOREIGN AFF. 698, 698 (1936); Maurice Amos, The Constitutional History of Egypt for
the Past Forty Years, 14 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS SOCIETY 131, 141–42, 147 (1928). These included
that Egypt’s independence would prejudice discussion over the future of the Sudan and what was dubbed “the
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political matters prevented the reaching of an agreement on the utilization of
the Nile’s resources until November 16, 1924, when Sir Lee Stack, the
Governor-General of the Sudan and Inspector General of the Egyptian Army,
was assassinated in Cairo by Egyptian nationalists demanding the full
independence of Egypt.55 Aware of Cairo’s sensitivity to any diminution of its
share of the Nile waters, Britain retaliated by, inter alia, announcing that it
would increase the water drawn from the Nile for irrigation in a major
Sudanese agricultural project “to an unlimited figure.”56 This immediately
caused tremors in Cairo, and, in the early 1920s, led to the establishment of a
Nile Waters Commission to identify Egypt’s needs from the Nile waters and
recommend modalities for undertaking waterworks on the river.57 The
Commission’s findings were incorporated as an integral part of the 1929 Nile
Waters Agreement.58
The treaty took the form of an exchange of notes between Egypt’s Prime
Minister Mohamed Mahmoud Pacha and Lord Lloyd, the British High
Commissioner in Cairo.59 Its most salient feature appeared in Paragraph 2 in
which Egypt acknowledged that economic development in Sudan requires the
use of greater amounts of water.60 This, however, should not impinge on either
the level of water already used by Egypt or diminish the amount of water
needed by Egypt for future expansion of irrigated land. This understanding,
which was to become a cause for contestation between the Nile riparians in the
future, was enshrined in the following provision:
[T]he Egyptian Government has always been anxious to encourage
such development [of Sudan], and will therefore continue that policy,
and be willing to agree with His Majesty’s Government upon such an
increase of this quantity as does not infringe Egypt’s natural and
historical rights in the waters of the Nile and its requirements of
agricultural extension, subject to satisfactory assurances as to the

security of communications,” which connoted unrestricted British access to and presence at the Suez Canal.
See Vernon, supra note 54, at 698. These issues continued to bedevil Egyptian-British relations until an
agreement was reached between Gamal Abdel Nasser’s revolutionary government and Britain in 1953. HAIL,
supra note 54, at x.
55 Donald Reid, Political Assassination in Egypt 1910‒1954, 15 INT’L J. AFR. HIST. STUD. 625, 630
(1982).
56 HAIL, supra note 54, at 8 (quoting the British High Commissioner in Egypt).
57 Howell, supra note 9, at 84
58 Id. at 85.
59 OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, supra note 37, at 100‒07.
60 Id. at 100.
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safeguarding of Egyptian interests as detailed in later paragraphs of
61
this note.

Thus, pursuant to this provision, it had become “assured to the Egyptian
fellah that the Nile will remain primarily his river and that that stream will be
primarily dedicated to making his field productive.”62 To further protect
Egyptian rights in the Nile waters, Paragraph 4(b) of the agreement, which was
also destined to become a source of great controversy, effectively granted
Egypt a “right of veto on development in the upstream territories, without any
corresponding restriction on her own freedom of development.”63
While the agreement was concluded between the British and Egyptian
governments, the former was acting on behalf of its colonial territories and
dependencies in the Nile Basin, which meant that the territorial scope of the
treaty extended to Sudan, Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda.64 Finally, the 1929
Nile Waters Agreement was designed and negotiated as a temporary settlement
pending the completion of discussions on both the nature of relations between
Egypt and Britain and the future status of the Sudan.65 In the opening
paragraph of his note to the British High Commissioner, the Egyptian Prime
Minister stated that “a settlement of these [irrigation] questions cannot be
deferred until such time as it may be possible for the two governments to come
to an agreement on the status of the Sudan,” and then concluded by affirming
that “the present agreement can in no way be considered as affecting the
61 Id. The report of the 1925 Nile Waters Commission calculated the quantity of Egypt’s “natural and
historical rights” as being 48 billion cubic meters. Jeffrey Azarva, Conflict on the Nile: International
Watercourse Law and the Elusive Effort to Create a Transboundary Water Regime in the Nile Basin, 25 TEMP.
INT’L & COMP. L. J. 457, 467 (2011). This was an increase of 4 billion cubic meters from the report of the 1920
commission. Id. Sudan’s usage of the Nile waters was determined to have increased from 1.5 to 4 billion cubic
meters. Id. These quantities were to form the basis on which the shares of both countries were calculated in the
1959 Agreement. See id. at 468. In addition, the agreement reserved the entire annual natural flow of the Nile
River exclusively for Egypt from January 19 to July 15. Starting on July 16, water can begin to be drawn for
the benefit of Sudanese irrigation projects. OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, supra note 37, at 105.
62 Pierre Crabites, The Nile Waters Agreement, 8 FOREIGN AFF. 145, 149 (1929‒1930).
63 Batstone, supra note 30, at 531. The text of the provision read as follows:

Save with the previous agreement of the Egyptian Government, no irrigation or power works or
measures are to be constructed or taken on the River Nile and its branches, or on lakes from
which it flows, so far as all these are in the Sudan or in countries under British administration,
which would in such a manner as to entail any prejudice to the interests of Egypt, either reduce
the quantity of water arriving in Egypt, or modify the date of its arrival, or lower its level.
OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, supra note 37, at 101.
64 OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, supra note 37, at 101–06 (referring to paragraphs 4(b) and 4(e), which
refer respectively to territories under “British administration” and “regions under British influence”).
65 Id. at 101–02.
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control of the river, which is reserved for free discussion between the two
governments in the negotiations on the question of the Sudan.”66
Overall, the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement, like all legal arrangements,67
reflected its political context. The agreement was partially London’s attempt to
placate the fears raised in Cairo by the 1924 announcement that it would
increase the waters drawn from the Nile for irrigation in the Sudan. After all,
Great Britain needed a friendly government in Egypt to ensure the protection
of its more vital interests: the Suez Canal.68 This was achieved by consecrating
Egypt’s status as the “primary riparian” in the Nile Basin, without any serious
consideration of the needs of Britain’s other dependencies in East Africa.69 In
addition, by acknowledging Sudan’s right to an independent share in the Nile
waters, Egypt, which at the time had still hoped to enjoy some sovereign
powers over its southern neighbor, made an implicit concession on the
question of the status of Sudan.70
Examined in its broader historical context, however, the agreement appears
as just another reflection of Egypt’s precarious existence. Cognizant of its total
dependence on the Nile as its sole lifeline, Egypt has always sought to secure
unrestricted access to the river’s riches.71 While some authors have seen this
and earlier treaties as embodying the “legacy of colonialism”72 or expressing

66

Id. at 100, 102–03.
As Felix Cohen noted, it is only in the transcendental heaven of legal concepts that “one met, face to
face, the many concepts of jurisprudence in their absolute purity, freed from all entangling alliances with
human life.” Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809,
809 (1935).
68 Batstone, supra note 30, at 532. Crabites depicted the trilateral relationship between Great Britain,
Egypt, and the Sudan eloquently:
67

It is accordingly clear that the Nile has always been looked upon by both Egypt and the Sudan as
Egypt’s river. As long as a community of interests obtained, as long as England occupied Egypt
and was but a joint partner in the administration of the Sudan, this attitude may readily be
understood. It was not that Britain loved the Sudan less; it was that she loved Egypt more.
Crabites, supra note 53, at 327.
69 Jacobs, supra note 29, at 108–09 (1993); Howell, supra note 9, at 85. Howell does, however, highlight
the fact that while Britain did not take into consideration the needs of its East African dependencies, most of
which related to the generation of hydro-electric power, “it could, of course, be argued that that the
construction of hydro-electric power works does not fall within the terms of the agreement so long as only the
natural run of the river is allowed to pass through the turbines or sluices, since this matter neither reduces the
flow nor affects the date of arrival in Egypt.” Id. at 85–86.
70 Okidi, supra note 44, at 172.
71 Id. at 164–65.
72 Id. at 162.
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Egyptian aspirations of “hegemonic control and dominance,”73 in reality this
was an exercise in survival. After all, “[t]he small and real Egypt may literally
be described as ‘the river, which is Egypt,’ meaning the land formed by the
deposit of the silt-laden annual flood” of the Nile.74
While most of the provisions of the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement related to
the utilization of the Nile waters in Sudan, it was in Uganda that the agreement
found its most prominent application. As discussed above, a number of studies
had been commissioned to propose waterworks along the Nile. Many of these
studies proposed a series of dams and waterworks to be undertaken at various
points on the upper reaches of both the Blue and White Niles.75 It was in this
context that, on May 30, 1949, Great Britain and Egypt signed the Agreement
Regarding the Construction of the Owen Falls Dam (Owen Falls Agreement)
to provide a source of hydroelectric power for Uganda.76 In its opening
paragraph, the agreement stated that it was concluded “in accordance with the
spirit of the Nile Waters Agreement of 1929.”77 Then, in compliance with the
provisions of the 1929 Agreement, Paragraph 5 of the Owen Falls Agreement
obliged the Uganda Electricity Board not to take any measures that “entail any
prejudice to the interests of Egypt in accordance with the Nile Waters
Agreement of 1929 and does not adversely affect the discharges of water to be
passed through the dam.”78 It is noteworthy that this agreement continues to be
applied and respected by Egypt and Uganda, which succeeded the United
Kingdom to the Owen Falls Agreement.79
B. The 1959 Nile Waters Agreement
Like its predecessors, the 1959 Agreement was shaped by its political
context. Coups d’état in Egypt and Sudan, the geographical and hydrological
realities of the two riparians, divergent visions for the administration of the
73 Abadir Ibrahim, The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement: The Beginning of the End of
Egyptian Hydro-Political Hegemony, 18 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 282, 295 (2011).
74 Crabites, supra note 53, at 324.
75 See Howell, supra note 9, at 83.
76 Exchange of Notes Constituting an Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Egypt Regarding the Construction of the Owen
Falls Dam, Uganda, Egypt.-U.K., art. I, May 30, 1949, 226 U.N.T.S. 274.
77 Id. (citations omitted).
78 Id. at 276.
79 In 1991, Egypt and Uganda signed an agreement extending the application of the 1949 Owen Falls
Agreement. See Exchange of Letters Constituting an Agreement between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the
Republic of Uganda on the Owen Falls Extension Project, Egypt-Uganda, art. I, May 12, 1991, U.N.T.S. No.
47817.
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river basin, and the aspirations of new national elites that rose to prominence
after the demise of British dominance all influenced the scope and content of
the treaty.
Despite the relative comfort provided by the 1929 Agreement, policymakers in Cairo remained bedeviled by the perennial question of how to secure
access to the quantities of water needed to fuel an expanding economy and to
feed a growing population.80 Likewise, with the independence of Sudan
looming on the horizon, administrators and hydrological experts in Sudan
began to devise developmental projects designed to exploit the Nile. Indeed,
discussions between the two countries began in the early 1950’s to
accommodate Sudan’s growing water needs and to discuss future projects
along the river.81 These discussions led to informal understandings allowing
Sudan to increase the quantity of water stored in its Sennar reservoir to be used
in various agricultural projects.82
This modus operandi did not, however, satisfy either country. In Egypt, a
coup d’état toppled the monarchy and established a republic led by the
nationalist leader Gamal Abdel Nasser who sought “nothing less than the
regeneration of Egyptian national life.”83 To achieve this, Nasser embarked on
a revolutionary program of political, economic, and social transformation.84 As
Nasser himself wrote, the centerpiece of this program was the construction of a
dam across the Nile at the southern town of Aswan to expand the irrigable land
in Egypt and to provide the electrical power needed to fuel an ambitious
industrialization program.85 The construction of the Aswan High Dam was not

80

Batstone, supra note 63, at 529.
I.H. Abdalla, The 1959 Nile Waters Agreement in Sudanese-Egyptian Relations, 7 MIDDLE E. STUD.
329, 330–31 (1971).
82 Id. at 331.
83 Peter Mansfield, Nasser and Nasserism, 28 INT’L J. 670, 688 (1973).
84 The literature on Gamal Abdel Nasser, his reign, his ideology, and his impact on Egypt, the Middle
East, and the world at large, is vast. A good place to start is with Nasser himself. Shortly after his ascent to
power, Nasser published a short book outlining his vision for Egypt. See GAMAL ABDEL NASSER, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION (1959); see also Fouad Ajami, On Nasser and His Legacy, 11 J. PEACE RES,
41 (1974). See generally R.H. DEKMEJIAN, EGYPT UNDER NASIR: A STUDY IN POLITICAL DYNAMICS (1971);
JOEL GORDON, NASSER’S BLESSED MOVEMENT: EGYPT’S FREE OFFICERS AND THE JULY REVOLUTION (1992);
P.J. VATIKIOTIS, NASSER AND HIS GENERATION (1978); PETER WOODWARD NASSER (1992).
Another important source is the writings of Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, who was Nasser’s confidant
and trusted advisor. See generally MOHAMED HASSANEIN HEIKAL, THE CAIRO DOCUMENTS: THE INSIDE
STORY OF NASSER AND HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH WORLD LEADERS, REBELS, AND STATESMEN (1973).
85 Gamal Abdel Nasser, The Egyptian Revolution, 33 FOREIGN AFF. 199, 204–05 (1955). The idea of
constructing a large dam at Aswan had been first proposed in 1876, and was then adopted by a Greek-Egyptian
81
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only a mammoth development project, it revolutionized the management of the
Nile:
Of all the great rivers of the world, the Nile is perhaps the most
unpredictable and unreliable. The volume of water it carries from the
monsoon-drenched highlands of central-east Africa to the parched
plains of Egypt varies enormously not only from one season to the
next, but also from year to year. As a result, Egypt’s economy, over
the centuries, has been afflicted by the biblical cycle of fat and lean
years and has been exposed to devastating floods as well as drought
and famine . . . . These alternating threats of flood and famine will be
86
removed for ever . . . .

The High Dam could not, however, be constructed without Sudan’s consent
because the backwaters created by the dam were projected to inundate the
Sudanese border-town of Wadi Halfa.87 Sudan’s consent, however, was not
forthcoming.88 Khartoum had a comprehensive, and considerably divergent,
plan for the utilization of the Nile waters.89 The Nile Valley Plan developed by
Sudan envisioned the construction of multiple dams and waterworks at various
locations along the White and Blue Niles.90 These projects included water
storage facilities and hydroelectric plants to satisfy the needs of the Nile
riparians.91 Egypt was not persuaded by Sudan’s elaborate scheme.92 Cairo’s

engineer who successfully convinced Egypt’s new leaders to pursue the project. See Collins, supra note 6, at
119.
86 Joachim Joesten, Nasser’s Daring Dream: The Aswan High Dam, 16 WORLD TODAY 55, 61–62
(1960).
87 See Gilbert F. White, The Environmental Effects of the High Dam at Aswan, 30 ENV’T, Sept. 1988, at
5. A total of 53,000 Nubian residents of Wadi Halfa were repatriated to villages to the southeast of Wadi
Halfa. Id. at 7. In addition to the flooding of Wadi Halfa, the backwaters of the High Dam inundated many of
the villages of the Nubian communities of southern Egypt and threatened hundreds of valuable archeological
sites and ancient treasures in the area. Fekri Hassan, The Aswan High Dam and the International Rescue Nubia
Campaign, 24 AFR. ARCHAEOLOGICAL REV. 73, 85 (2007). Therefore, an international campaign was launched
in cooperation with UNESCO to relocate the Nubian communities and to save ancient artifacts found in the
region. See generally id.
88 Batstone, supra note 30, at 526.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 526. When the Egyptian government unveiled its plans to its Sudanese counterpart, the latter
objected first because of the impact the dam would have on Wadi Halfa, and second because it was becoming
increasingly apparent that Sudan was going to need greater quantities of water to satisfy its agricultural needs.
See Collins, supra note 7, at 120. (“No Sudanese minister in the full flush of independence could agree to such
onerous terms . . . .”) It was in this context that the Nile Valley Plan was prepared by the British irrigation
experts advising the Sudanese government and published in June 1958. See id.
92 Richard Elliot Benedick, The High Dam and the Transformation of the Nile, 33 MIDDLE E. J. 119, 122‒
23 (1979).
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grand design was attractive because “alternative plans would have involved
complicated international negotiations with several upstream countries, some
of dubious political stability, whereas the High Dam placed the storage under
Egyptian control, could be completed more quickly, and had the added
advantage of providing hydroelectric power.”93
Faced with Egypt’s intransigence, Sudan relented and accepted the
principle of constructing the Aswan High Dam.94 As discussions between the
two countries proceeded, Khartoum presented a series of conditions for
approving the project.95 First, an agreement had to be reached on the
apportionment of the Nile waters before construction commenced.96 This was
because Sudan hoped to increase its share of the Nile waters beyond the 1929
Agreement’s allotment.97 Sudan also feared that if Egypt began construction,
Egypt would argue that it had further acquired rights and thus enlarged its
share of the river waters.98 Second, Sudan demanded that Egypt defray the
costs of relocating and compensating the residents of the Sudanese village of
Wadi Halfa.99 Third, Sudan required that the future agreement stipulate that it
would be free to construct any waterworks that it felt were necessary to utilize
its share of the Nile River.100 This condition was intended to free Sudan from
the virtual veto that Egypt enjoyed over waterworks in Sudan and other
riparians pursuant to the 1929 Agreement.101 Finally, in what was to prove to
be the most contentious issue during the negotiations, Sudan proposed that the
net gain in the river’s yield projected by the construction of the High Dam
should be divided according to a ratio of the total flow of the river.102 Egypt
rejected Sudan’s proposals, asserting “That the proposals produced by the
Sudan delegation were most unreasonable, and that, had they been applied,
Egypt would have had to sacrifice a part of her established right to her present
share.”103

93

Id.
Abdalla, supra note 81, at 336.
95 Id. at 331–32.
96 Id.
97 See Valerie Knobelsdorf, The Nile Waters Agreements: Imposition and Impacts of a Transboundary
Legal System, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 622, 629 (2005–2006).
98 Batstone, supra note 30, at 547.
99 Abdalla, supra note 81, at 332.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
94
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As successive rounds of negotiations were held without fruition, political
tensions between the two states heightened. First, a territorial dispute over the
Halayeb and Shalateen region in southwest Egypt undermined confidence
between the two parties.104 Then, in what Egypt considered a violation of the
1929 Agreement, Sudan unilaterally increased the level of the Sennar reservoir
and announced that it would consider the construction of the Roseires dam.105
The impasse in negotiations ensued until political developments in Sudan
provided the opportunity for a breakthrough. On November 17, 1958, General
Ibrahim Abboud led a coup d’état against the civilian government, reportedly
at the urging of the Prime Minister who considered the army a potential ally
against his political adversaries.106 Eager to showcase a foreign policy success
to help entrench its local legitimacy, Khartoum’s new leadership accelerated
negotiations with Cairo.107 Less than one year later, on November 8, 1959, the
Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters was signed in Cairo.108
The agreement, which was the first to be signed between Nile riparians in
the post-colonial era, includes a preamble and five parts.109 The opening
paragraphs of the preamble confirm that this new agreement is predicated on
the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement: “While the 1959 Agreement effectively
replaced allocations set forth in the 1929 Agreements, the agreements together
create a comprehensive regime.”110 This is best reflected in Part One of the
treaty, which, drawing on the 1929 Agreement, identifies the “acquired rights”
of both countries as being 48 billion cubic meters (bcm) for Egypt and 4 bcm
for the Sudan.111 Part Two codifies the quid pro quo underlying the entire
agreement. Sudan approved the construction of the Aswan High Dam, and

104

Id. at 333.
Id. at 333, 336; Fadwa Taha, The History of the Nile Waters in the Sudan, in THE RIVER NILE IN THE
POST-COLONIAL AGE, 188–89 (Terje Tvedt ed. 2010).
106 Abdalla, supra note 81, at 335–36. The change in the political leadership in Khartoum indicated to
Cairo that it was closer to reaching an agreement with Sudan. Id. at 336. Therefore, despite having not yet
formally signed an agreement with Sudan, Egypt went ahead and concluded an agreement with the Soviet
Union on December 27, 1958 for the financing of the Aswan High Dam. Id. The Soviet Union also dispatched
teams of technical experts to advise the Egyptian government on the construction process. See Joachim
Joesten, supra note 86, at 60–61.
107 Abdalla, supra note 81, at 336.
108 Agreement Between the Republic of the Sudan and the United Arab Republic for the Full Utilization
of the Nile Waters, United Arab Republic-Sudan, Nov. 8, 1959, 453 U.N.T.S 51 [hereinafter 1959 Nile Waters
Agreement].
109 See generally id.
110 Knobelsdorf, supra note 97, at 628.
111 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, supra note 108, art. 1, para. 1.
105
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Egypt consented to the erection of the Roseires Dam in Sudan.112 The main
stumbling block during negotiations, namely the division of the surplus waters
that would be available after the construction of the High Dam, was overcome
when Sudan dropped its previous proposals and accepted a fixed share of 14.5
bcm, while Egypt was assigned 7.5 bcm.113 This brought the total share of the
two countries of the Nile waters up to 55.5 bcm for Egypt and 18.5 bcm for
Sudan.114 Egypt also agreed to pay Sudan 15 million Egyptian Pounds as
indemnification for damages incurred by the Sudanese residents of Wadi
Halfa.115
Part Three of the agreement identifies a series of waterworks and
conservation projects that the two states would undertake jointly to increase the
yield of the river.116 This part also stipulates that the benefits incurred from
these projects would be divided equally and outlined the procedures for sharing
the construction costs.117 Part Four established a Permanent Joint Technical
Commission to oversee the implementation of the agreement and to provide a
forum for the joint management of the river’s resources.118 The fifth and final
part of the treaty, titled General Provisions, deals with relations between the

112

See id. art. 2.
Id.; Abdalla, supra note 81, at 336–37.
114 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, supra note 108, art. 2, para. 4. These figures were calculated on the
basis of the average yield of the river during the previous century, which was determined to be 84 bcm
annually. Id. art 2, para. 3. It was also calculated that the average increase in the yield due to the construction
of the High Dam would amount to 22 bcm, which were divided according to a ratio of 14.5:7.5. Id. art. 2, para.
4. Article 5 of Part Two of the agreement stipulated that, if in future years the total yield of the river increases
beyond 84 bcm, then that increase would be divided equally between the two parties. Id. art. 5. The acceptance
of the Sudanese delegation of this formula instead of their previous proposals is imputed by one author to
“[t]he veiled intention of the military régime in Khartoum to buy the good will of Nasir, which was
undoubtedly necessary for stable government in the Sudan.” Abdalla, supra note 82, at 337.
115 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, supra note 108, art.2, para. 6. Commenting on this provision, one author
noted:
113

The money compensation of £15 million which Egypt agreed to pay the Sudan for the damage by
flooding, was much less than the most unbiased Sudanese hoped to get. It amounted to only half
of the original estimate of £30 million produced by the Sudan delegation in the Nile waters talks
before 1959. Certainly, it was a negligible figure if it is compared to the fantastic figure of
£313,127,500, which the Halfawis had put forward.
I.H. Abdalla, supra note 82, at 337 (citations omitted).
116 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, supra note 108, art. 3.
117 Id. art. 3, para. 1.
118 Id. art. 4. On January 17, 1960, Egypt and Sudan signed the Protocol Concerning the Establishment of
the Permanent Technical Commission referred to in the 1959 Agreement. OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, supra
note 37, at 143. The Protocol determines the composition of the commission’s members and determines the
modalities for altering its membership. Id.
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two parties to the treaty and the other Nile riparians.119 First, this part requires
that Egypt and Sudan adopt a unified position during any negotiations with
other riparian states.120 Second, should these negotiations lead to the allotting
of shares of the Nile waters to other states, that “amount shall be deducted
from the shares of the two Republics in equal parts, as calculated at Aswan.”121
The 1959 Agreement has received mixed reviews. For one scholar, the
agreement is:
[A] model International Rivers’ water-sharing agreement. It contains
some “advanced” ideas and principles governing cooperation and
sharing of efforts and burdens relative to the international river. A
joint Technical Commission is entrusted with the study of the various
Nile projects. The principles of equity, compensation for damages
and respect for acquired rights have all been included in the
122
Agreement.

Others have offered less flattering views. For example, while
acknowledging that the agreement is “entirely exclusive and bilateral,” one
author claims that the “the 1959 Agreement effectively bound all upstream
riparians to the allocations” stipulated by the treaty.123 The same author also
argues that “[i]n essence, if an upstream nation wished to develop projects
along the river, it would have to obtain not only Egyptian approval, but also
mandatory technical oversight and contractual supervision.”124 Another scholar
questioned the concept of ‘acquired rights’ that underlies both the 1929 and
1959 agreements “particularly because determining the precise contents of
those rights under international law has proved troublesome.”125 A third view
highlights the inadequacy of the water-shares allocated to the two signatories
of the 1959 Agreement due to deepening water scarcity, growing populations,
expanding agricultural sectors, and climatic events such as droughts.126
While a full evaluation of the political, social, and economic impact of the
Agreement is beyond the purview of this Article, a few remarks can be made in

119

1959 Nile Waters Agreement, supra note 108, art. 5.
Id. art. 5, para. 1.
121 Id. art. 5, para. 2.
122 S. Ahmed, Principles and Precedents in International Law Governing the Sharing of Nile Waters, in
The NILE, supra note 6, at 351, 357.
123 Knobelsdorf, supra note 97, at 629.
124 Id. at 630.
125 Azarva, supra note 61, at 469.
126 Carroll, supra note 2, at 275, 281‒82, 293.
120
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this regard. First, the socio-economic benefits reaped primarily by Egypt, but
also by Sudan, from the construction of the Aswan High Dam, which is the
agreement’s most tangible result, have been immense.127 Second, unlike its
colonial-era predecessors, the 1959 Agreement was contracted between two
independent states.128 This is reflected in the object, purpose, and language of
the agreement.129 As discussed above, the 1929 Agreement placed Egyptian
interests at the forefront.130 Egypt’s existing uses were immune to diminution,
its future uses enjoyed priority, and it could veto any waterworks in the
territories of the upper riparians.131 This was a relationship of subservience to
Egypt’s needs. The 1959 Agreement, on the other hand, was predicated on a
community of interest between sovereign equals. Egypt could not embark on a
major development project without Sudan’s approval, while the latter secured
Egypt’s consent to build an important hydrological facility across the
watercourse.132
More broadly, the agreement was not designed to merely authorize the
construction of two dams. Rather, it sought to establish a new modus operandi
in the Nile Basin. By establishing a forum for joint technical cooperation
between the two countries, the 1959 Agreement introduced the idea of
common resource management to the region.133 For example, future projects
were to be constructed by common agreement, their costs were to be borne
jointly, and their benefits were to be equally shared.134 This all marks a
significant departure from the rationale underlying the 1929 Agreement and

127 See M.A. Abou Zeid & F.Z. El-Shibini, Egypt’s High Aswan Dam, 13 INT’L J. WATER RES. DEV. 209,
210 (1997).
128 Azarva, supra note 61, at 459.
129 See Carroll, supra note 2, at 279–81.
130 Azarva, supra note 61, at 466‒67.
131 Id. at 467.
132 See 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, supra note 108, art. 2, para. 2, art. 3, para. 2. As Lisa Jacobs
observes:

[T]his treaty, although only approved because it bowed to theories of “established and prior
appropriation,” actually had equitable apportionment as its guiding focus . . . . Under the
agreement, established rights are only one factor considered before the evaluation of equitable
shares. . . . Egypt, by acknowledging the claims of others, at long last conceded that it was not the
primary “owner” of the Nile. Sudan received a much more equitable treatment than it had in the
past. The other Nile Basin countries were at least mentioned as claimants that might be
recognized as worthy in the future.
Jacobs, supra note 29, at 113 (citations omitted).
133 Jacobs¸ supra note 29, at 122.
134 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, supra note 108, art. 4.
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earlier instruments.135 Finally, contrary to the aforementioned view that the
treaty binds non-signatory upper riparians or that it stipulates “mandatory
technical oversight and contractual supervision,”136 the 1959 Agreement
realized that those states are likely to demand larger shares of the Nile waters
in the future, and it prescribed an equal deduction of the two parties’ allotment
to satisfy those demands.137
C. Post-1959 Agreements and Arrangements for the Utilization of the Nile
River
While not the focus of this Article, a synopsis of the agreements and
cooperative arrangements established since the signing of the 1959 Agreement
will be useful to understanding the current state of the Nile River watermanagement regime that South Sudan joined as the basin’s eleventh riparian
state.138
Almost immediately after the 1959 Agreement entered into force, Egypt
and Sudan entered consultations with upper riparians on the joint management
of the river.139 These discussions revealed the need to undertake studies to
improve the available technical information on the hydrology of the Nile
basin.140 This led to the launch of the HYDROMET Survey in 1967 to “collect
and analyze the data with the view to assisting the participant countries in
water resources planning. The Egyptians and the Sudanese viewed this as an

135 Compare id. (mandating bilateral agreement on construction projects), with OFFICE OF LEGAL
AFFAIRS, supra note 37, at 101 (“In case the Egyptian Government decide to construct in the Sudan any works
on the river and its branches, or to take any measures with a view to increasing the water supply for the benefit
of Egypt, they will agree beforehand with the local authorities on the measures to be taken for safeguarding
local interests. The construction, maintenance and administration of the above-mentioned works shall be under
the direct control of the Egyptian Government.”).
136 Knobelsdorf, supra note 97, at 630.
137 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, supra note 108, art. 4.
138 See generally John Waterbury, Legal and Institutional Arrangements for Managing the Water
Resources in the Nile Basin, 3 INT’L J. WATER RES. DEV 92 (1987), for a historical overview. While discussion
here will be limited to basin-wide multilateral initiatives, there have been numerous bilateral agreements
between various co-riparians. See generally id. For example, Egypt and Ethiopia signed an agreement on July
1, 1993 in which both parties undertook to “refrain from engaging in any activity related to the Nile waters that
may cause appreciable harm to the interests of the other party.” Framework for General Co-operation Between
the Arab Republic of Egypt and Ethiopia, Egypt-Eth., art. 5, July 1, 1993, U.N.T.S. No. 47816.
139 Sam Laki, Management of the Water Resources of the Nile Basin, 5 INT. J. SUSTAIN. DEV. WORLD
ECOL. 288, 294 (1998).
140 Id.
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integrated approach that would provide the groundwork for inter-governmental
cooperation in the regulation, storage, and use of the Nile waters.”141
Then, upon Egypt’s initiative, a regional grouping of the Nile riparians,
named Undugu,142 was established in 1983 to foster basin-wide cooperation
beyond the level of hydrological studies.143 The initiative included questions
“such as infrastructure, environmental cooperation, culture and trade in the
Nile River basin areas and the contiguous states.”144 The Undugu eventually
evolved, in December 1992, into the Technical Committee for Cooperation for
Integrated Development and Environmental Protection of the Nile Waters
(TECCONILE), which functions as a forum for consultations among the
riparians on the utilization of the river’s resources for development.145 This
initiative set the stage for the establishment on February 22, 1999 of the Nile
Basin Initiative (NBI).146 The Nile Council of Ministers (Nile-COM), which
oversees the NBI, agreed on a Strategic Action Plan “[t]o achieve sustainable
socio-economic development through the equitable utilization of, and benefit
from, the common Nile Basin water resources.”147 Achieving these objectives
is undertaken through a wide variety of hydrological, social, and economic
projects, some of which are designed for basin-wide implementation, while
others are intended for sub-basin application.148
The most ambitious endeavor launched by the NBI was the attempt to reach
a holistic basin-wide agreement on a legal framework to govern the utilization
of the water resources of the Nile River. In 2007, after a decade of
negotiations, a Comprehensive Framework Agreement (CFA) was submitted
for approval by the Nile-COM, and opened for signature in May 2010.149 The
141 Id. In addition to Egypt and Sudan, Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda participated in
this project. Ethiopia refused to become a full member and elected to participate as an observer. Id.
142 Undugu is the Swahili word for “brotherhood.” CHARLES W. RECHENBACH, SWAHILI-ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 556 (1967).
143 Korwa Adar, The Interface between National Interest and Regional Stability: The Nile River and the
Riparian States, 11 AFR. SOC. REV. 4, 8 (2007).
144 Id.
145 Abdel Fattah Metawie, History of Co-operation in the Nile Basin, 20 INT’L J. WATER RES. DEV. 47, 54
(2004).
146 Id.; see also About us, NILE BASIN INITIATIVE, http://www.nilebasin.org/newsite/index.php?option=
com_content&view=section&id=5&layout=blog&Itemid=68&lang=en (last visited Sept. 10, 2013).
147 Metawie, supra note145, at 54; NILE BASIN INITIATIVE, supra note 146.
148 Salah El-din Amer et al., Sustainable Development and International Cooperation in the Eastern Nile
Basin, 67 AQUATIC SCI. 3, 8 (2005). This work also provides an example of projects undertaken in the Eastern
Nile Basin under the rubric of the NBI. See id.
149 Azarva, supra note 61, at 487, 489–90. The full text of the treaty is available at http://
internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/regionaldocs/Nile_River_Basin_Cooperative_Framework_2010.pdf.
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treaty, however, did not receive the unanimous support of all riparians. Egypt
and Sudan, who throughout the negotiations adopted a unified position as
stipulated by the 1959 Agreement, expressed reservations regarding Article 14
of the CFA.150 This provision, titled “Water Security,” proscribes the use of the
watercourse in a manner that would “significantly affect the water security of
any other Nile Basin State.” Egypt and Sudan, however, proposed amending
the text to state: “Not to adversely affect the water security and current uses
and rights of any other Nile Basin State.”151
As some authors have noted, while packaged as a question of “water
security,” in reality the dispute is over the status of the existing uses of the Nile
waters, which are predominantly Egyptian and Sudanese.152 These two
countries have sought to immunize their current uses from possible diminution
due to the growing needs of their co-riparians.153 On February 28, 2011,
Burundi announced that it signed the CFA, bringing the total number of
signatories to six, and allowing for the ratification process to commence.154 As
of this writing, Egypt and Sudan, continue to reject and denounce the CFA,
and have announced that, as non-parties to the treaty, they are not bound by its

150 Adonia Ayebare, Issue Brief: A Political Storm Over the Nile 3–4, INT’L PEACE INST. (Dec. 6, 2010),
http://ipinst.org/publication/policy-papers/detail/315-a-political-storm-over-the-nile.html.
151 Id. at 4.
152 See Ibrahim, supra note 73, at 295; Dereje Z. Mekonnen, From Tenuous Legal Argument to
Securitization and Benefit Sharing: Hegemonic Obstinacy—The Stumbling Block Against Resolution of the
Nile Waters Question, 4 MIZAN L. REV. 232, 235 (2010); Dereje Z. Mekonnen, The Nile Basin Cooperative
Framework Agreement Negotiations and the Adoption of a ‘Water Security’: Flight into Obscurity or a
Logical Cul-de-Sac? 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 421, 430 (2010).
153 As Ambassador Nabil Fahmy, a senior Egyptian diplomat and former Ambassador to the United
States, observed:

The current crisis has arisen around an initiative by five Nile Basin states to form the Cooperative
Framework Agreement in May 2010 to seek more water from the Nile. This would effectively
abrogate a 1929 treaty Egypt signed with British colonial authorities allowing the country veto
rights over any upriver Nile development projects such as irrigation. Egypt and Sudan strongly
opposed this measure as threatening their national security, with particular criticism directed at
Ethiopian plans to construct the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, a large hydropower project
on the Nile.
Nabil Fahmy, Egypt in the World: A Foreign Policy for the Twenty-First Century, 6 CAIRO REV. GLOBAL AFF.
91, 98 (2012), available at http://www.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/CairoReview/Lists/Articles/Attachments/222/CR6Fahmy.pdf.
154 In addition to Burundi, the other signatories are Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda.
Burundi Signs the Nile Cooperative Framework Agreement, NILE BASIN INITIATIVE NEWS, http://www.
nilebasin.org/newsite/index (last visited Aug. 24, 2013).
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provisions and continue to enjoy the rights stipulated in earlier Nile waters
agreements.155
III. THE LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION TO TREATIES
Having outlined the catalogue of treaties and institutional arrangements
governing the utilization of the Nile River waters, this Article will now
examine whether the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement has devolved onto South
Sudan upon its independence from Sudan on July 9, 2011.
The law of state succession to treaties supposedly provides the answer to
this question. Therefore, this part commences by defining state succession and
distinguishing it from government succession, with which it is occasionally
confused. This is followed by a brief overview of the main theories developed
by jurists on the impact of state succession on international treaties. Then the
content and structure of the 1978 Convention on Succession of states in
Respect of Treaties (1978 Convention),156 purportedly the principal instrument
governing this area of international law, is examined. In particular, attention
will focus on the dichotomy established by the convention between states
emerging out of decolonization and those that gained independence through
other processes, such as secession or dissolution of political unions. Finally,
recent state practice will be surveyed to determine whether the rules codified in
the convention reflect customary international law. This Part concludes with
the finding that the 1978 Convention is not directly applicable to the case of
South Sudan, and that its provisions requiring the devolution of treaties onto
states emerging from non-colonial settings, such as South Sudan, is not
reflective of customary international law.
A. Defining State Succession
Although various definitions of state succession have been proffered,157
international practice and scholarly opinion have converged on the formulation
155 Salman M.A. Salman, The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement: A Peacefully Unfolding
African Sping, 38 WATER INT’L 17, 21–23 (2012).
156 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Aug. 23, 1978, 1946 U.N.T.S 3
[hereinafter 1978 Vienna Convention].
157 For example, writing in 1965, Karl Zemanek defined state succession in the following terms: “State
succession is viewed as a problem of state responsibility. It takes place when a legally relevant event causes
acts of government in a given territory to be attributed to a subject of international law other than that to which
they were attributed before the event.” Karl Zemanek, State Succession After Decolonization, 116 RECUEIL
DES COURS, 182,189 (1965).
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adopted by Article 2(b) of the 1978 Convention, which defines state succession
as “the replacement of one State by another in the responsibility for the
international relations of territory.”158 A predecessor state is “the State which
has been replaced by another State on the occurrence of a succession of
States,”159 while the successor state is one “which has replaced another State
on the occurrence of a succession of States.”160
In addition to successor and predecessor states, the 1978 Convention added
a third category of states called “newly independent States.”161 This category
represents the distinguishing feature of the Convention, refers to “a successor
State the territory of which immediately before the date of the succession of
States was a dependent territory for the international relations of which the
predecessor State was responsible.”162 These definitions were reused in the
1983 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property,
Archives and Debts.163
What these definitions convey is that state succession regulates the impact
of change in the international legal personality of a particular territory. To put
it simply, it relates to the legal effects of the birth and death of states. State
succession is “concerned with the management of the many consequences of
factual changes in the geography of rule . . . . It is also transitional in the sense
that it mediates between the ‘before’ and ‘after’ of political change.”164
State succession should not, however, be confused with government
succession. These are two distinct processes. Any change in the nature and
identity of the governing authority does not affect the international legal
personality of a state.165 In other words, international law distinguishes
between a “change of State personality and change of the government of the
State.”166 When governments change, “[t]here is a strong presumption that the
State continues to exist, with its rights and obligations, despite revolutionary
158

1978 Vienna Convention, supra note 156, art. 2(b).
Id. art. 2(c).
160 Id. art. 2(d).
161 Id. art. 2(f).
162 Id.
163 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property. Archives and Debts art. 2,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.117/14 (Apr. 7, 1983), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 306 (1983). [hereinafter 1983 Vienna
Convention].
164 MATTHEW CRAVEN, THE DECOLONIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: STATE SUCCESSION AND THE
LAW OF TREATIES 23 (2007).
165 JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (2d ed. 2007).
166 Id.
159
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changes in government, or despite a period when there is no, or no effective,
government.” 167
Despite the adoption of two U.N. conventions, numerous judicial
pronouncements, and volumes of scholarly work on state succession,168 this is
an area of international law that remains beset with “great uncertainty and
controversy.”169 The ambiguity of the law of state succession remains even if
investigation is limited to one particular subset of this area of international law:
namely, state succession to treaties. As D.P. O’Connell, perhaps the most
influential scholar on the subject, puts it:
[O]pinions on the matter are as diverse as the practice of States is
incoherent. Much of the opinionated discussion has been politically
and even ideologically motivated, and it has tended to concentrate
upon modalities rather than upon principles. For this reason, the topic
has escaped from the confines of juristic logic and has really become
170
a feature of political science or of public administration.

The indeterminacy of the law of state succession to treaties is confounded
by the fact that it is inextricably intertwined with multiple subjects and
principles of international and domestic law, including the law of treaties,
constitutional law, state sovereignty, and self-determination, each of which is
afflicted by varying degrees of uncertainty. Despite warnings to the
contrary,171 this is no reason for disheartenment or despair. State succession to

167

Id.
Other than publications that will be regularly referenced throughout this paper, some of the most
important scholarly works on state succession include: TAI-HENG CHENG, STATE SUCCESSION TO
COMMERCIAL OBLIGATIONS (2006); PATRICK DUMBERRY, STATE SUCCESSION TO INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY (2007); ARTHUR KEITH, THE THEORY OF STATE SUCCESSION WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
ENGLISH AND COLONIAL LAW (1907); STATE SUCCESSION: CODIFICATION TESTED AGAINST THE FACTS (Martti
Koskenniemi & Pierre Michel Eisemann eds., 2000); Mohammed Bedjaoui, Problèmes Récents de Succession
d’Etats dans les Etats Nouveaux, 130 RECUEIL DES COURS, 456 (1970); Erik Castrén, Aspects Récents de la
Succession d’Etats, 78 RECUEIL DES COURS 379 (1951); Amos S. Hershey, The Succession of States, 5 AM. J.
INT’L. L. 285 (1911); C. Wilfred Jenks, State Succession in Respect of Law-Making Treaties, 29 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. 105 (1952); R.Y. Jennings, State Succession, 121 RECUEIL DES COURS, 437 (1967); A.N. Sack, La
Succession aux Dettes Publiques d’État, 23 RECUEIL DES COURS 145 (1928); Brigitte Stern, La Succession
d’Etats, 262 RECUEIL DES COURS 9 (1996); Manlio Udina, La Succession des Etats quant aux Obligations
Internationales autres que les Dettes Publiques, 44 RECUEIL DES COURS 665 (1933).
169 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 650 (7th ed. 2008).
170 D.P. O’Connell, Recent Problems of State Succession in Relation to New States, 130 RECUEIL DES
COURS, 95, 170 (1970).
171 After studying African practice in the area of state succession, one author concluded that “[t]he
international lawyer seeking a way out of this marshland is as likely as ever to be led into the centre of the
miry bog itself.” Tiyanjana Maluwa, Succession to Treaties in Post-Independence Africa: A Retrospective
168
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treaties remains amenable to scholarly examination, which, to instill a
semblance of order to the field, this section will commence here with a brief
overview of the main theoretical paradigms that have marked scholarly and
policy debates in this area.
B. Theories of State Succession to Treaties
Starting as early as Aristotle’s Politics,172 continuing with the writings of
the fathers of modern international law, such as Pufendorf, Grotius, and Vattel,
and extending to the doctrines developed during the era of decolonization,
philosophers and jurists have advanced a myriad of theories on state succession
and its legal implications.173 Nonetheless, it is generally agreed that there are
two antipodal theoretical paradigms of state succession to treaties, the first of
which is the theory of universal succession.174 At the opposite side of the
spectrum is the tabula rasa or clean slate theory.175
1. The Universal Succession Theory
“According to the general universal succession theory, the continuity of
rights and obligations of the predecessor States is compulsory and is governed
by the operation of the rules of law regardless of the consent of the States
concerned.”176 This theory, drawn from Roman inheritance law, was first
proposed by Hugo Grotius who argued that the personality of the state is

Consideration of Some Theoretical and Practical Issues with Special Reference to Malawi, 4 AFR. J. INT’L. &
COMP. L. 791, 810 (1992).
172 Under the title “Continuity of Identity of the State,” Aristotle writes:
And this topic seems to be part of yet another question—how are we to tell whether a state is still
the same state or a different one? We might try to investigate this question using territory and
inhabitants as criteria; but this would not carry us far, since it is quite possible to divide both
territory and population into two, putting some people in one part and some into the other. . . .
For the state is a kind of association—an association of citizens in a constitution; so when the
constitution changes and becomes different in kind, the state also would seem necessarily not to
be the same. . . . But whether, when a state’s constitution is changed, it is just to disown its
obligations or to discharge them—that is another question.
ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS, BOOK III, 175–76 (T.A. Sinclair trans. 1981).
173 See O’Connell, supra note 170, at 104–15, for a discussion of these various theories and how they
reflected varying conceptions of the nature of the State.
174 Yilma Makonnen, State Succession in Africa: Selected Problems, 200 RECUEIL DES COURS 93, 103
(1987).
175 See id. at 114.
176 Id. at 104.
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inextinguishable.177 This meant that the rights and obligations of former
sovereigns necessarily devolve on their successors in the same fashion as the
property and debts of deceased persons become the responsibility of their
successors.178 Grotius, however, qualified the universal succession rule by
exempting successors from obligations contracted by sovereigns in their
personal capacities and not as part of the duties of office.179 This distinction
becomes important later with the introduction of the concept of dispositive or
‘real’ treaty obligations.
2. The Tabula Rasa Theory
The tabula rasa or clean slate theory, which emerged in the nineteenth
century, is predicated on the claim that successor States do not inherit any of
the rights or obligations of their predecessors.180 In other words, the successor
state is born into international life with a “clean-slate” of treaty relations. As

177
178
179

See HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 684 (Richard Tuck, ed. 2005) (1625).
Id.
In Chapter IX, “When Jurisdiction and Property Cease,” Grotius writes:
That the Person of the Heir is to be looked upon to be the same as the Person of the Deceased, in
Regard to the Continuance of Property, either publick or private, is an undoubted Maxim. . . .
And consequently, the Right of the Deceased is not extinct; it is continued in the Person of the
Heir to whom it devolves. It is a Maxim of Roman Law, agreeable to the Principles of the Law of
Nature, that An Inheritance is nothing but a Succession to the whole Right which the Deceased
enjoyed.

Id.
Then in Chapter XIV, “Promises, Contracts, and Oaths of those who have the Sovereign Power,”
Grotius further clarified his position on the impact of succession on what in modern parlance would be
considered international treaties:
Let us now come to the Successors; and here we must distinguish between those who inherit all
the Goods of the deceased King, as he who receives a patrimonial Kingdom, either by will, or
from an Intestate; and between those who succeed in the Kingdom only, as by a new Election, or
by Prescript, and that either in Imitation or other common Inheritances, or otherwise; or whether
succeeding by a mixt Right. For they who inherit all the Goods of with the Kingdom, are without
doubt obliged to perform all the Contracts and Promises of the late King . . . But how far they
who succeeded barely to the Crown, or to the Goods only in Part, and to the Crown entirely, are
obliged (by the Contracts of the Predecessor) does deserve as much to be inquired into, as it has
been hitherto treated without Order. . . . But . . . mediately . . . on the account of the State, such
successors are obliged; which must be thus understood. Every Society, as well as every particular
Person, has a Power to oblige itself either by itself, or by its major Part. This Right they may
transfer, their expressly, or by necessary Consequence, by transferring, for Instance, the
Sovereignty: For in Morals, he who gives the End, gives all the Things that conduce to the End.
Id. at 811–12.
180 Makonnen, supra note 174, at 107.
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one scholar who canvassed the views of various proponents of this theory
explains:
[U]pon total State succession the predecessor State’s personality and
identity completely disappear. An entirely new international
sovereign personality appears in its place, but there is no legal
connection or derivation between the predecessor and the successor
States. . . . [T]he new sovereign is absolutely free of any of its
predecessor’s obligations. . . . The new sovereign is considered to be
original and to derive its authority from none other than itself.
Therefore, the fact that it appropriated the territory of the former
State does not entail or result in derivation of rights and obligations
181
from the predecessor sovereign.

3. The Politics and Practice of State Succession
State succession is one area of international law where abstract theory has
not stood the test of political reality. State practice in various historical periods
reveals that, when faced with the necessities of governance, states do not
adhere unwaveringly to either of these theories.182 “In reality, neither of these
two positions is wholly tenable, nor do they provide ready solutions to the
range of problems that arise in the context of state succession.”183
Starting with the tabula rasa theory, it has been observed that an
uncompromising application of this approach would cause considerable chaos
to the international legal system.184 States and other international actors would
be unsure of the stability and continuity of rights and obligations enshrined in
treaties contracted with their partners if such treaties were totally revocable
upon succession.185 Indeed, conceptually, in rejecting any possibility for
181

Id. at 107–08.
There have, however, been some isolated cases of full adherence to the tabula rasa theory. One of
these is the question of the succession of Israel to legal obligations of the Mandate Government of Palestine.
Jose Carlos Rozas, La Succession d’Etats en Matière de Convention Fluviales, in THE LEGAL REGIME OF
INTERNATIONAL RIVERS AND LAKES, 131 (Raplgh Zacklin & Lucius Caflisch eds., 1981). In response to a
questionnaire sent by the International Law Commission to U.N. Member States during the preparation of the
Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, Israel affirmed that “on the basis of the generally recognized principles
of international law, Israel which was a new international personality, was not automatically bound by the
treaties to which Palestine had been a party and that its future treaty relations with foreign Powers were to be
regulated directly between Israel and the foreign Powers concerned.” Replies from Governments, Y.B. INT’L L.
COMM’N 215, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add.1.
183 Matthew C.R. Craven, The Problem of State Succession and the Identity of States under International
Law, 9 EURO. J. INT’L L. 142, 148 (1998) .
184 See Makonnen, supra note 174, at 108.
185 Detlev Vagts, State Succession: The Codifiers’ View, 33 VA. J. INT’L L. 275, 281–82 (1993).
182
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succession to legal obligations, this theory not only undermines confidence in
treaties as a prime method for concluding international transactions, “it also
appears to deny the possibility of law.”186
Similarly, the universal succession theory has been subjected to
considerable criticism. Primarily, some scholars have questioned the
appropriateness of the unequivocal importation into international law of a
concept originally designed to regulate succession to the estates of natural
persons.187 Second, by purporting to bind a successor state to the full panoply
of treaty relations of the predecessor state, this theory ignores the reality that
the former enjoys an international legal personality distinct and separate from
that of the latter.188 This means that, in relation to the successor, the
predecessor’s treaties are res inter alios acta and cannot entail any obligations
for the successor.189
The inadequacy of these two grand theories of state succession becomes
ever more apparent when observing the actual state practice. Having advised
multiple governments on matters of succession to treaties and investigated the
matter in depth, O’Connell concluded that policy decisions were “taken on the
basis of how the treaty would work in the changed circumstances. If it would
work smoothly governments are prepared to continue it in force. If it would
work in a distorted fashion they are likely to take the opposite view.”190
The practice of the Nile riparians corroborates this observation. Indeed, the
positions adopted by these states regarding the status of treaties contracted
during the colonial era, especially those relating to the utilization of the Nile
River, demonstrates the disconnect between the theory and practice of state
succession. As they gained independence, the Nile riparians adopted a broad
spectrum of positions that reflected their hydrological interests.191 None of
these positions can be neatly categorized as falling within either of the two
aforementioned theories of state succession. Rather, policies drew on elements

186
187
188
189

Craven, supra note 183, at 149.
Makonnen, supra note 174, at 105.
See id.
A.P. Lester, State Succession to Treaties in the Commonwealth, 12 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 475, 479–80

(1963).
190 D.P. O’Connell, Reflections on the State Succession Convention, 39 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES
ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 725, 738 (1979), available at http://www.zaoerv.de/39_1979/39_
1979_4_a_725_739.pdf.
191 See Yimer Fisseha, State Succession and the Legal Status of International Rivers, in THE LEGAL
REGIME OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS AND LAKES 189 (Ralph Zacklin & Lucius Caflisch eds., 1981).
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of both theories and were essentially designed to give the governments of these
newly independent states the flexibility to evaluate the contractual relations
inherited from former colonial masters and to determine which of these treaties
would devolve onto them.
The most noteworthy policy position adopted by a Nile riparian regarding
state succession to treaties came from Tanzania, which formulated what came
to be known as the Nyerere Doctrine.192 Named after President Julius Nyerere,
the doctrine resembles the tabula rasa theory in many respects, but departs
from it in some of its features.193 This doctrine was formulated in a letter from
the Prime Minister of Tanzania (then called Tanganyika) to the Secretary
General of the United Nations, the relevant sections of which state:
As regards bilateral treaties validly concluded by the United
Kingdom on behalf of the territory of Tanganyika or validly applied
or extended by the former to the territory of the latter, the
Government of Tanganyika is willing to continue to apply within its
territory, on a basis of reciprocity, the terms of all such treaties for a
period of two years from the date of independence (i.e., until 8
December 1963) unless abrogated or modified earlier by mutual
consent. At the expiry of that period, the Government of Tanganyika
will regard such of these treaties which could not by the application
of the rules of customary international law be regarded as otherwise
surviving, as having terminated.
It is the earnest hope of the Government of Tanganyika that during
the aforementioned period of two years, the normal processes of
diplomatic negotiations will enable it to reach satisfactory accord
with the States concerned upon the possibility of the continuance or
194
modification of such treaties.

Clearly, this was a repudiation of the universal succession theory. But it
was not an endorsement of the tabula rasa approach either. Rather, it was a
policy that granted Tanganyika the broadest measure of discretion to determine
those treaty obligations that it would accept, those it would modify, and those
it would elect to revoke. The Nyerere Doctrine has been adopted by almost all
Eastern African countries, including Burundi, Kenya, Malawi, and Uganda, but
in a manner to meet their particular situations. 195
192

Makonnen, supra note 174, at 121.
See Makonnen, supra note 176, at 121–48.
194 U.N. SECRETARIAT, UNITED NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES, MATERIALS ON SUCCESSION OF STATES, at
177, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/14, U.N. Sales No. E/F.68.V.5 (1968).
195 Makonnen, supra note 176, at 136.
193
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These positions inevitably impacted the legal regime regulating the use of
the Nile River.196 Consistent with the Nyerere Doctrine, the Government of
Tanganyika addressed identical diplomatic notes to Britain, Egypt, and Sudan
on July 4, 1962, declaring that it considered the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement
to have lapsed upon the independence of Tanganyika.197 Kenya and Uganda,
on the other hand, remained silent on the question of the validity of the 1929
Agreement and other colonial-era agreements, which led scholars to assume
that both countries considered themselves bound by the 1929 Agreement.198
Meanwhile, Sudan’s position regarding the 1929 Agreement was marked by
considerable irresolution. Prior to Sudan’s independence on January 1, 1956,
officials in Khartoum announced that they would consider the 1929 Agreement
to have lapsed on independence in accordance with the principle of rebus sic
stantibus.199 Following independence, however, Sudan announced that, while it
was not officially renouncing the agreement or disputing the rights established
therein, it was calling for revisiting its provisions which it considered as being
manifestly unjust.200 Ethiopia, which was not subject to the 1929 Agreement
because it had not been a territory subject to the British Crown, issued an AideMemoire to put on the record its position regarding the utilization of the Nile
waters.201 In this document, the Ethiopian government:
reasserted and reserved now and in the future the right to take all
such measures in respect of its water resources and in particular . . .
those waters providing so nearly the entirety of the volume of the
196 See generally Arthur Okoth-Owiro, The Nile Treaty: State Succession and International Treaty
Commitments: A Case Study of the Nile Waters Treaties, in OCCASIONAL PAPERS EAST AFRICA NO. 9 (2004),
http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_6306-544-1-30.pdf.
197 Id. at 37.
198 BONAYA ADHI GODANA, AFRICA’S SHARED WATER RESOURCES: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS
OF THE NILE 150–152 (1985). It should be recalled here that, as it relates to Uganda, the 1949 Owen Falls Dam
Agreement, which continued to be implemented following Uganda’s independence and has been renewed and
reaffirmed in 1991, had been predicated on the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement. See supra Part II. Kenya’s
position remained unchanged until, in 2003, when its parliament announced that it was repudiating the 1929
Agreement. See Knobelsdorf, supra note 97, at 633.
199 GODANA, supra note 198, at 144–45. See generally Malgosia Fitzmaurice & Olufemi Elias,
Contemporary Issues in The Law of Treaties 173–200 (2005); Paul Reuter, Introduction to the Law of Treaties
188–93 (1995); Athanassios Vamvoukos, Termination of Treaties in International Law: The Doctrine of Rebus
Sic Stantibus and Desuetude (1985); Oliver J. Lissitzyn, Treaties and Changed Circumstances (Rebus Sic
Stantibus), 61 AM. J. INT’L L. 895 (1967), on the principle of rebus sic stantibus, otherwise known as the “the
fundamental change of circumstances.”
200 GODANA, supra note 198, at 145. As discussed above in Part II, the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement is
wholly predicated on the 1929 Agreement. Indeed, both Egypt and the Sudan agreed that the 1929 Agreement
had been a partial framework for the utilization of the Nile waters, and that the 1959 Agreement was designed
to provide a holistic framework for the joint use of the river’s resources by both countries. See supra Part II.
201 Fisseha, supra note 191, at 189.
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Nile, whatever may be the measure of utilization of such waters
202
sought by recipient States situated along the course of the river.

Finally, reflecting its precarious hydrological position, Egypt consistently
argued that all Nile waters agreements, including the 1929 Nile Agreement,
devolved onto the riparian states following their independence.203
The controversies, confusion, and uncertainty surrounding the status of the
Nile waters agreements demonstrates the difficulty of discerning consistent
patterns of state practice from which a coherent lex lata on state succession to
treaties can be formulated. It was against this background, and in the midst of
the decolonization tsunami of the mid-1960’s, that the International Law
Commission drafted what was to become the 1978 Vienna Convention.
C. The 1978 Vienna Convention on State Succession in Respect of Treaties
Cognizant of the cataclysmic changes occurring in the structure of
international relations, on December 18, 1961 the UN General Assembly
instructed the International Law Commission (ILC) “to include on its priority
list the topic of succession of States and Governments.”204 In its following
session, the General Assembly amended its instructions slightly by requesting
that while considering the question of state succession the ILC should give
“appropriate reference to the views of States which have achieved
independence since the Second World War.”205 This focus on the process of
decolonization, which reflected the political environment of the times,206 was

202
203
204

Id.
Godana, supra note 198, at 143–44.
G.A. Res. 1686 (XVI), U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/5100, at 62 (Dec. 18,

1961).
205

G.A. Res. 1765 (XVII), U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/5217, at 65 (Nov. 20,

1962).
206

One author noted:
As a result of decolonization and the emergence of former colonies as newly independent states
following the Second World War, the international community grew concerned over the lack of a
formal agreement on treaty succession. In response to this concern, the United Nations General
Assembly directed the International Law Commission (ILC) to study the matter. The result was
the Treaty Succession Convention, the purpose of which was to codify customary law and further
develop the law of treaty succession.

Diba B. Majzub, Does Secession Mean Succession? The International Law of Treaty Succession and an
Independent Québec, 24 QUEEN’S L.J. 411, 424–25 (1999).
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to become the hallmark of the draft articles prepared by the ILC which evolved
into the 1978 Convention.207
Articles 1 and 3 of the 1978 Convention limit its scope to the impact of
state succession on treaties contracted between states.208 This means that
agreements concluded between states and other subjects of international law,
such as international organizations, are beyond the purview of the 1978
Convention. Similarly, the 1978 Convention does not examine the effects that
a change of government has on international treaties.209
1. The Structure of the 1978 Convention
The 1978 Convention is predicated on a summa divisio that distinguishes
between, on one side, states born out of the process of decolonization and, on
the other side, states emerging from non-colonial settings.210 The Soviet
delegate at the Vienna Conference on Succession of States in Respect of
Treaties expressed this basic structural feature of the convention succinctly:
“The entire draft convention had been based on the premise that there were
only two alternatives: either a State was a newly independent State or it was
not.”211 As discussed above,212 a “newly independent state” denotes a category
of successor states that were, prior to independence, a dependency of a
predecessor state that was responsible for the international relations of that
successor state.213 The term “dependency” was intended as a catchall phrase to
refer to all forms of colonial relationships including colonies, U.N.
trusteeships, League of Nations mandates, and protectorates.214

207 See CRAVEN, supra note 164, at 93–206, for an analysis and overview of discussions in the ILC. The
1978 Convention was adopted on August 23, 1978, and entered into force on November 6, 1996. As of 2009,
the convention has 22 State parties and 19 signatories. 3 SECRETARIAT, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED
WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL: STATUS AS AT 1 APRIL 2009, at 541, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/26, U.N.
Sales No. E.09.V.3 (2009).
208 1978 Vienna Convention, supra note 156, arts. 1, 3.
209 Commentaries on the Draft Articles on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, [1974] 2 Y.B. INT’L
L. COMM’N, 174–75, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1974/Add.1 (Part 1), U.N. Sales No. E.75.V.7 (Part 1)
[hereinafter ILC Commentaries].
210 1978 Vienna Convention, supra note 156, art. 16.
211 2 INT’L L. COMM., UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON SUCCESSION OF STATES IN RESPECT OF
TREATIES: OFFICIAL RECORDS, at 59, para. 23, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.80/16/Add.1, U.N. Sales No. E.79.V.9
(1979).
212 See supra Part III.A.
213 1978 Vienna Convention, supra note 156, art. 2(f).
214 ILC Commentaries, supra note 209, at 176.
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In relation to treaties contracted by colonial powers on behalf of these
dependent territories, the 1978 Convention adopted a general rule that
approximates the tabula rasa theory. The relevant provision of the convention
states: “A newly independent State is not bound to maintain in force, or to
become a party to, any treaty by reason only of the fact that at the date of the
succession of States the treaty was in force in respect of the territory to which
succession of States relates.”215
The rationale for distinguishing decolonization from other state-creating
processes was two-fold. First, despite lacking an international legal personality
and being under the tutelage of a metropole, colonies were considered to enjoy
a standing that is separate and distinct from their administering power.216 This
led to the conclusion that treaties contracted by the latter should not ipso jure
become binding upon newly independent States.217 Second, the international
community could not ignore the seismic impact that decolonization had on

215 1978 Vienna Convention, supra note 156, art. 16. In its commentary on this provision, the ILC
clarified the implications of this provision, and how it differed from an extreme version of the tabula rasa
theory that would have called for the full renunciation of treaties contracted by the predecessor state’s treaties
on behalf of the newly independent state:

The metaphor of the clean slate is a convenient way of expressing the basic concept that a newly
independent State begins its international life free from any obligation to continue in force
treaties previously applicable with respect to its territory simply by reason of that fact. But even
when that basic concept is accepted, the metaphor appears in light of existing State practice to be
at once too broad and too categoric. It is too broad in that it suggests that, so far as concerns the
newly independent States, the prior treaties are wholly expunged and are without any relevance
to its territory. The very fact that prior treaties are often continued or renewed indicated that the
clean slate metaphor does not express the whole truth. The metaphor is too categoric in that it
does not make clear whether it means only that a newly independent State is not bound to
recognize any of its predecessor’s treaties as applicable in its relations with other States, or
whether it means also that a newly independent State is not entitled to claim any right to be or
become a party to any of its predecessor’s treaties. As already pointed out, a newly independent
State may have a clean slate in regard to any obligation to continue to be bound by its
predecessor’s treaties without it necessarily following that the new independent State is without
any right to establish itself as a party to them.
See id. at 212.
216 The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations echoed this sentiment when it affirmed
that the right to self-determination was predicated on the fact that “[t]he territory of a colony or other NonSelf-Governing Territory has, under the Charter, a status separate and distinct from the territory of the State
administering it.” G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8082, at 124
(Oct. 24, 1970).
217 Andrew M. Beato, Newly Independent And Separating States’ Succession to Treaties: Considerations
on the Hybrid Dependency of the Republics of the Former Soviet Union, 9 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 525, 533–35
(1994).
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global politics: “For the first time in history, international law contained a rule
granting a right to some communities, those which qualified as ‘peoples,’ to
create their own independent States.”218 The uniqueness of decolonization and
the need to recognize the special status of former colonies was stressed by
numerous delegations while negotiating the 1978 Convention.219
Having applied a version of the tabula rasa theory to former colonies, the
1978 Convention then moved to considering the status of treaties inherited by
states emerging from all the other possible scenarios by which a state can be
created. The relevant provisions of the convention appear in Part IV, “Uniting
and Separation of States.”220 This part covers an innumerable variety of
political situations that can lead to the birth or death of a state or the
reorganization of its territory. These include the creation of a new state from
the unification of two or more states,221 the emergence of one or more
successor states from the dissolution of a union,222 and the separation of part of
a state to form an independent successor state whether or not the predecessor
state continues to exist.223
From its survey of state practice, the ILC realized that history and political
ingenuity had produced a number of possible forms and shapes for the uniting
and separation of states.224 The ILC, therefore, elected to disregard these
variations and designed a rule of succession that would apply uniformly to all
successor states born out of any of these processes:225
218 Marcelo G. Kohen, Introduction to SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 1, 1 (Marcelo G.
Kohen ed. 2012).
219 For example, the representative of Sierra Leone expressed the opinion that “the process of
decolonization could not be equated to the process of separation of States which were already independent.
Those were two quite different processes and to equate them would be to deny the success of decolonization.”
Conference on Succession of States, supra note 211, at 68. Likewise, the delegate from Austria declared that,
“[h]is delegation understood the priority given by the International Law Commission to the ‘clean slate’
principle with respect to newly independent States: it was justified by the particular historical situation in
which those countries had been created.” Conference on Succession of States, supra note 211, at 62.
220 1978 Vienna Convention, supra note 156, Part IV.
221 Id. art. 31.
222 Id. art. 34.
223 Id. arts. 34–35.
224 ILC Commentaries, supra note 209, at 253.
225 Thus, in relation to the creation of new States by the uniting of a number of predecessor States, the
ILC stated:

The succession of States envisaged in the present articles does not take into account the particular
form of the internal constitutional organization adopted by the successor State. The uniting may
lead to a wholly unitary State, to a federation or to any form of constitutional arrangement. In
other words, the degree of separate identity retained by the original States after their uniting,
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Although the Commission explicitly applied the ‘clean slate’
principle to problems of succession arising in respect of newly
independent States, it departed significantly from that approach for
problems of succession in respect of the uniting or separating of
States. The Convention prescribes a principle of ipso jure continuity
226
of treaties.

The justification for this doctrinal volte-face was explained by Sir Francis
Vallat, the last ILC Special Rapporteur on the subject, during negotiations on
the 1978 Convention. First, it was assumed that a legal nexus continued to
exist between the international legal personality of the successor State and the
territory that it inherited from the predecessor State.227 Second, a rule of treaty
continuity was adopted in the interest of the stability of international
contractual relations and to avoid undue disruption to the foundational
principle of the sanctity of treaties.228
2. The Status of South Sudan and the Deleted Draft Article 33(3) of the
1978 Convention
Where does South Sudan fit in this dichotomy established by the 1978
Convention? Is the world’s newest state a “newly independent State” within
the meaning of the 1978 Convention, or is it an example of a successor State
created by the separation of part of a state? Answering these questions is
indispensable to determining the rules of state succession to treaties that are
applicable to South Sudan.
First, it is important to establish the relevant terminology. The Machakos
Protocol described the choice available to the southern Sudanese as one
between either remaining in a unified Sudan or secession.229 On the other hand,
James Crawford, an eminent authority on questions of statehood, would

within the constitution of the successor State, is irrelevant for the operation of the provision set
forth in these articles.
Id. Similarly, the ILC refused to distinguish between the various processes of dissolution of unions,
dismemberment of states, secession, and/or the separation of parts of a state, “[a]fter studying the modern
practice, however, the Commission concluded that the almost infinite variety of constituted relationships and
of kinds of “union” render it inappropriate to make this element the basic test for determining whether treaties
continue in force upon a dissolution of a state. Id. at 265.
226 Matthew G. Maloney, Succession of States in Respect of Treaties: The Vienna Convention of 1978, 19
VA. J. INT’L L. 885, 908 (1979).
227 2 INT’L L. COMM., supra note 211, at 107.
228 See id. at 104.
229 The Machakos Protocol, supra note 15, at 308.
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categorize the independence of South Sudan as an act of devolution: “The key
difference between secession and devolution is that the former is essentially a
unilateral process, whereas the latter is bilateral and consensual.”230 This raises
a second question: was South Sudan’s independence from the Sudan
consensual? According to Jure Vidmar, with whom this author agrees, yes.231
Despite emerging out of a deadly civil war and coming as the culmination of a
long struggle against discrimination and marginalization, by signing the CPA,
Sudan approved the creation of South Sudan: “South Sudan did not become an
independent State until the central government formally agreed to hold a
binding referendum on independence at which secession was supported by an
overwhelming majority. . . . South Sudan is thus a rare example of a right to
independence being exercised under domestic constitutional provisions.”232
Sudan’s consent does not, however, settle the question of whether South
Sudan is a newly independent State or a separating part of a state for the
purposes of the 1978 Convention. After all, in most of the undisputedly
colonial cases of former African and Asian possessions of European powers
“the progress to self-government or independence was consensual.”233 As a
state created through the application of the right to self-determination, which
was exercised through a popular referendum, South Sudan resembles former
African colonies in some respects. On the other hand, the relationship between
Sudan and South Sudan can hardly be characterized as a ‘dependency’ akin to
what had prevailed between European powers and their colonial possessions.
The CPA and the 2005 Interim Constitution of the Sudan granted South Sudan
considerable autonomy within the Republic of the Sudan. The Government of
Southern Sudan exercised broad powers in the territories under its
jurisdiction,234 southern representatives occupied high executive offices in the

230 James Crawford, State Practice and International Law in Relation to Secession, 69 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L.
85, 86 (1998).
231 See Jure Vidmar, South Sudan and the International Legal Framework Governing the Emergence and
Delimitation of States, 47 TEX. INT’L L. J. 541, 558 (2012).
232 Id. at 553.
233 Crawford, supra note 230, at 89.
234 Schedule (B) of the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, which was adopted after the signing of
the CPA between the Government of the Sudan and the SPLM/A, listed the following powers among those
exercised by the Government of Southern Sudan in territories under its jurisdiction: organizing military,
security, and police forces; taxation; budgetary matters; appointing civil servants; and overseeing matters of
health, education, and welfare. INTERIM CONSTITUTION Jan. 9, 2005, Schedule (B) (S. Sudan), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4ba749762.html.
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central government,235 and held thirty percent of the seats of the transitional
national legislature.236
In short, South Sudan sits uneasily in a twilight zone between the two
general categories constructed by the 1978 Convention.237 It is neither a former
dependency “in the classical sense of ‘salt-water’ colonialism,”238 nor is it
clear case of State-creation through secession.
Remarkably, the ILC had envisioned a situation exactly like that of South
Sudan. Draft Article 33 that was prepared by the Commission, which became
Article 34 of the 1978 Convention, included a third paragraph that read:
Notwithstanding paragraph 1, if a part of the territory of a State
separates from it and becomes a State in circumstances which are
essentially of the same character as those existing in the case of the
formation of a newly independent State, the successor State shall be
regarded for the purposes of the present articles in all respects as a
239
newly independent State.

When draft Article 33 and this sub-paragraph came up for discussion
during the negotiations over the 1978 Convention, what ensued turned out to
be one of the most contentious debates of the conference. The Swiss and
French delegations proposed revisiting draft Article 33 by applying the tabula
rasa theory to all states, including those created by the uniting or separation of
states.240 In essence, Switzerland and France challenged the fundamental
235 According to Article 62(1) of the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, one of the two VicePresidents of the united Sudan was from Southern Sudan. Id.art. 62(1). In addition, the constitution stipulated
that thirty percent of cabinet seats were to be assigned to Southern Sudan in the national unity government
formed after the signing of the CPA. Id. art. 80.
236 Id. art. 117(1).
237 One scholar, who examined the cases of Bangladesh and the former Soviet Republics, has also argued
that these two situations bear features of both newly independent States and the separation of parts of a state,
and argued for the recognition of a third hybrid category that is marked by “internal dependency.” Andrew
Beato, Newly Independent and Separating States’ Succession to Treaties: Considerations on the Hybrid
Dependency of the Republics of the Former Soviet Union, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 525, 546, 555 (1994).
238 Vidmar, supra note 231, at 543.
239 ILC Commentaries, supra note 209, at 260.
240 As the Swiss representative explained:

The essential part of the proposal by the French and Swiss delegations was the deletion of
subparagraph (a) of article 33, paragraph 1, which imposed on the successor State the continuity
of treaties concluded by the predecessor State, and of article 33, paragraph 3, which made it
possible to assimilate certain cases of separation to the case of formation of a newly independent
State—a provision that would be pointless once a single régime had been established.
2 INT’L L. COMM., supra note 211, at 54.
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structure of the 1978 Convention by distinguishing between former colonies
and all other states.241 The rationale for this proposal was multifaceted. First, it
was argued that, in applying the rule of continuity to states emerging from noncolonial contexts, the ILC “was not simply reflecting the present state of the
law, but was proposing progressive development.”242 In doing so, however, the
ILC failed to adequately justify the universal application of the continuity of
treaties rule to the infinite variety of cases of dissolution, dismemberment, and
separation of parts of states.243 Second, the Swiss delegate highlighted that the
ILC had not “proposed an objective legal criterion for distinguishing the newly
independent State, in that particular sense, from other new States.”244 It was the
absence of this clear distinguishing criterion that had compelled the ILC to
introduce subparagraph 3, quoted above, to cover intermediate or controversial
cases.245 The Swiss and French delegates noted that this “might raise
insurmountable interpretation difficulties” as to the determination of the
applicable rule in the various cases of State-creation.246 Third, anticipating that
other states would object to making the tabula rasa theory generally applicable
to all new States because that would cause major disruptions to international
treaty relations, the Swiss delegate stated:
[I]n reality there was no such danger and that where there was a
common interest, the two States would not fail to reach agreement in
order to ensure the continuity of the treaty. Indeed, the practice of
decolonization showed that in spite of the “clean slate” principle,
most of the treaties concluded by the colonial Powers with third
States had been maintained in force by agreement between those third
247
States and the newly independent State.

While some delegations, including Greece,248 Turkey,249 and Mexico250
supported this amendment, the vast majority of States rejected it.251 For many
States, the distinction constructed by the ILC between newly independent

241 France stated unequivocally what it “had against it, was that it treated differently two identical legal
situations . . . . Why should a State which seceded not be considered a newly independent State?” Id. at 55.
242 Id. at 53.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 Id. at 60.
249 Id. at 58.
250 Id. at 56.
251 Id. at 57–60.
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States and States emerging out of the uniting or separation of States was
indispensable for the stability of international relations and the security of
contractual relations. The United States, for example, emphasized that “rights
freely accorded under a treaty should not be cut off because one State united
with another, under Article 30, or separated into two or more parts, under
Article 33.”252 Similarly, the United Kingdom argued that the Franco-Swiss
proposal would “result in further destabilizing international treaty relations,”
and warned that it would “encourage secessionist movements;”253 an argument
which resonated with many delegations.254 For the vast majority of
delegations, however, it was the unique nature of the colonial experience that
necessitated the special treatment of formerly dependent territories and which
justified freeing those newly independent states from treaties contracted by
their colonial masters.255 This sentiment was unanimously expressed by
African countries, and reiterated by delegations from various regions. Senegal,
for example, asserted that “[w]hat put newly independent States into a category
of their own was that they had emerged as a result of the decolonization
process; States having separated themselves from larger territories were
entirely different, and it would be totally illogical to deny that difference.”256
Mali,257 Kenya,258 Egypt,259 and Sierra Leone260 all espoused similar positions.
Among the European countries emphatically supporting the structure of the
1978 Convention was Italy, which argued that “international law was based not
only on logic but on history, political realities, and the requirements of
international life. It was impossible to claim that when two States separated . . .
they were beginning a completely new existence like those emerging from
decolonization.”261 Other non-African states that rejected the Franco-Swiss
proposal included the Soviet Union,262 Belorussia,263 Cyprus,264 Japan,265
Panama,266 Denmark,267 and Brazil.268

252

Id. at 58.
Id. at 59–60.
254 See id. at 104, 106–07 for the statements of the Philippines, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, and Zaire,
expressing support for the U.K’s argument.
255 Id. at 104–07.
256 Id. at 61.
257 Id. at 62.
258 Id. at 65–66.
259 Id. at 68.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 61.
262 Id. at 59.
263 Id. at 57–58.
264 Id. at 60.
253
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As support grew for the ILC’s draft of the 1978 Convention, the debate
shifted to whether it was necessary to retain subparagraph 3 to cover those
intermediate cases, like South Sudan, that did not fully qualify as either a
newly independent state or uniting and separating state.269A minority of
delegations argued in favor of preserving this provision. Citing its own
experience, Singapore clarified that:
[A]t the time of decolonization in 1963, Singapore had united with
Malaysia, from which it had separated two years later. Up to 1965,
when it became an independent State, Singapore had never been
empowered to conclude treaties. . . . [T]he wording of paragraph 3 of
draft article 33 where it referred to “circumstances which are
essentially of the same character as those existing in the case of the
formation of a newly independent State,” to be sufficiently flexible to
270
cover the case of Singapore.

Israel also supported the proposed subparagraph 3 and suggested that it
could apply to “cases of ‘revolutionary’ separation of part of the territory of a
State, involving a clean break, whereas paragraph 1 covered cases of
‘evolutionary’ separation.”271 Despite these appeals, most delegations favored
the deletion of subparagraph 3. For these states, the principal difficulty with
this provision lay with its indeterminacy and the lack of clarity regarding the
characteristics of cases falling within its ambit.272 As the representative of the
Netherlands stated: “Paragraph 3 was superfluous . . . it established an
undesirable third category of States which fell outside the definitions
established in article 2 [of the draft articles] and would give rise to
difficulties.” As the negotiations proceeded, more delegations expressed
support for deleting subparagraph 3 by mostly citing the confusion and
uncertainty that this provision would cause.273

265

Id.
Id. at 61‒62.
267 Id. at 63.
268 Id. at 64.
269 Id. at 65.
270 Id. at 65. The delegation of Suriname also referred to its experience and expressed a similar sentiment
as that of Singapore. See id. at 106.
271 Id. at 64.
272 See id. at 65.
273 See id. at 106–08, for the statements of Senegal, the Soviet Union, Italy, Yemen, Tanzania, Qatar,
Malaysia, and Mali expressing support for the deletion of subparagraph 3.
266
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After nine sessions of negotiations on Article 33, the article and the
proposed amendments were put to a vote.274 The Franco-Swiss proposal to
make the tabula rasa theory the generally applicable rule throughout the
convention was defeated by 69 votes to 7 with 9 abstentions, while the deletion
of subparagraph 3 was approved by 52 votes to 9 with 22 abstentions.275
“[T]he effect of the Conference’s decision to remove the qualifying clause
within what became Article 34 (relating to cases ‘analogous’ to
decolonization) was to concretize a sharp distinction between the colonial
experience on the one hand (in which the principle of self-determination would
be operative) and other cases of secession.”276
Therefore, according to the 1978 Convention, regardless of the fact that it
had gained independence through the exercise of the right to selfdetermination, South Sudan is a case of secession to which the rule of treaty
continuity applied. This means that, assuming that Article 34 is the applicable
law, upon its birth on July 9, 2011, the Republic of South Sudan inherited the
treaty obligations contracted by the Republic of Sudan, including the 1959 Nile
Waters Agreement.
3. Does the 1978 Convention Express Customary International Law?
This Article would have been shorter and easier to write had Sudan been a
party to the 1978 Convention. Sudan, however, has signed the convention on
August 23, 1978, but has yet to ratify it.277 This means that whether treaties
contracted by Sudan have devolved onto South Sudan is a matter that can only
be settled by reference to the relevant rules of customary international law.
Therefore, this section will canvass recent incidents of State succession to
determine whether State practice conformed to the 1978 Convention,
particularly Part IV thereof, and thus confirmed the customary status of the
rule of treaty continuity.
Upon its adoption, the 1978 Convention encountered a lukewarm reception.
Regardless of whether they disapproved of the convention or applauded it,
scholars unanimously considered it to be “an example of the progressive
development of international law, rather than a codification of customary

274
275
276
277

Id. at 109.
Id.
CRAVEN, supra note 164, at 202.
3 SECRETARIAT, supra note 207, at 541.
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international law.”278 D.P. O’Connell, a critic of the convention, argued that
the succession to treaties is “a subject altogether unsuited to the processes of
codification, let alone of progressive development.”279 A more complimentary
view applauded the ILC for its “innovation and courage,” and argued that the
final text reflected “an altogether sensible compromise between conflicting
interests.”280 Eighteen years later when the convention entered into force,
scholars continued to consider it an unreliable “guide to this area of
international law,”281 and dismissed it as “little more than an interesting
historical document.”282 Less disparagingly, Oscar Schachter cited the views of
the U.S. State Department Legal Adviser who considered the 1978 Convention
to be declarative of custom to evince that the convention had indeed influenced
state policies.283
One particularly recurring critique of the 1978 Convention centers on its
structure that gave pride of place to the process of decolonization and failed to
differentiate between the innumerable political processes through which States
are born.284 This implied that the ILC “had become obsessed with a transient
form of political change and had disregarded the obvious possibility that
‘future’ cases of succession would assume a very different character. . . . [A]s a
consequence, the frame and orientation of the Convention appeared largely
useless.”285 In short, for many scholars, the 1978 Convention is condemned to
be a prisoner of the historical era in which it was authored, a relic of
decolonization.
Nonetheless, the grounds on which to appraise the 1978 Convention and
examine whether its principles are reflective of customary law is the degree to
which it influenced state behavior. The trials and tribulations of the 1990s that
ushered in a wave of new states provide the opportunity to examine the impact
of the convention.286 The implosions of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the

278

ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 369 (2007).
O’ Connell, supra note 190, at 726.
280 Maloney, supra note 226, at 913‒14.
281 DAVID BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 60 (2010).
282 ANTHONY AUST, VIENNA CONVENTION ON SUCCESSION OF STATES IN RESPECT OF TREATIES 2 (3d ed.
2009), available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/vcssrt/vcssrt_e.pdf.
283 Oscar Schachter, State Succession: The Once and Future Law, 33 VA. J. INT’L L. 253, 257 (1993).
284 For example, in Ian Brownlie’s view, “the distinction between a secession [referring to a newly
independent State] and the dissolution of federations and unions is unacceptable, both as a proposition of law
and as a matter of principle.” IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 668‒69 (4th ed. 1990).
285 CRAVEN, supra note 164, at 16.
286 AUST, supra note 278, at 369.
279
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unifications of Germany and Yemen, the resurrection of the Baltic States, and
the death of Czechoslovakia provide ample material to determine whether the
rules and principles enshrined in the convention informed state practice and
policy.287
In theory, these latest entrants into the international club of States fall
within the category of “Uniting and Separation of States” covered by Part IV
of the 1978 Convention.288 In other words, the applicable rule would be the
devolution of the predecessor state’s treaties onto the successor State(s).289
This would apply regardless of whether the successor state was born out of the
creation or dissolution of a union, the secession or separation of part of a state,
or the absorption of one state by another.290
Starting with the demise of the Soviet Union, on December 8, 1991, it was
declared that “the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a subject of
international law and a geopolitical reality no longer exists.”291 Shortly
thereafter, the former Soviet republics announced that they consider
themselves “equal successors to the rights and obligations of the former
USSR.”292 Prima facie this suggests that the continuity of treaty obligations
enshrined in Article 34 of the 1978 Convention was applied. Closer inspection,
however, reveals that the devolution of Soviet treaty obligations did not
proceed so neatly. Primarily, of all the successor States, only the Russian
Federation succeeded the Soviet Union to its Permanent Seat on the U.N.

287 See id. at 369–83; Karl Zemanek, The Legal Foundations of the International System: General Course
on Public International Law, 266 RECUEIL DES COURS 66, 84 (1997).
288 See generally 1978 Vienna Convention, supra note 156, Part IV.
289 Id. arts. 31, 34.
290 Id.
291 Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States Belr.-Russ.-Ukr., Dec. 8–21, 1991,
31 I.L.M. 138, 143 [hereinafter Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth]; see also Sergei Voitovich, The
Commonwealth of Independent States: An Emerging Institutional Model, 4 EURO. J. INT’L L. 403, 404 (1993).
292 Tarja Långström, The Dissolution of the Soviet Union in the Light of the 1978 Vienna Convention on
Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, in LA SUCCESSION D’ÉTATS: LA CODIFICATION Á L’ÉPREUVE DES
FAITS / STATE SUCCESSION: CODIFICATION TESTED AGAINST THE FACTS, 723, 743 (Pierre Michel Eisemann &
Martti Koskenniemi eds., 2000). Indeed, as one expert explained in a firsthand account of the process of the
dissolution of the USSR:

[O]n December 4, 1991, before the dissolution of the USSR, eight republics signed (in fact all of
the former Soviet republics were invited to sign) a Treaty on Succession to the USSR’s State
Debt and Assets. On December 30, 1991 the heads of the CIS countries agreed that each had a
right to a fixed and just share of the properties of the former USSR abroad.
Rein Mullerson, New Development in the Former USSR and Yugoslavia, 33 VA. J. INT’L L. 299, 306 (1993)
(internal citations omitted).
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Security Council293 and acquired the diplomatic missions of the Soviet
Union.294 These measures were not challenged by other successor States or the
international community.295
Second, apprehension in Western states, particularly the U.S., over the fate
of the vast arsenal of Soviet weapons of mass destruction led to the conclusion
of a series of legal and political arrangements to ensure successor States that
inherited these weapons complied systems with the arms control agreements
signed by the Soviet Union.296 These arrangements did not, however, treat the
former Soviet republics as “equal successors” to the U.S.S.R. Rather, it was
assumed that “all former Soviet republics should subscribe to the U.S.S.R.’s
arms control and disarmament obligations, but that Russia should maintain
control over all nuclear weapons.”297 Thus, the Russian Federation became a
nuclear weapons state-party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, while
other successors joined as non-nuclear weapons states.298
Third, the unequal treatment of the former Soviet republics extended
beyond arms control. As discussed above, Article 34 of the 1978 Convention
disregards the pre-independence status of successor states.299 All states born
out of a non-colonial setting are assumed to have inherited the predecessor
state’s obligations.300 The case of the Baltic States, however, is an example of
how their status prior to their incorporation into the Soviet empire was
determinative of whether or not they succeeded to Soviet treaty obligations.301
Generally, these states did not consider themselves successors of the Soviet
Union on the grounds that the Red Army illegitimately occupied their

293 Yehuda Z. Blum, Russia Takes Over the Soviet Union’s Seat at the United Nations, 3 EURO. J. INT’L L.
354, 360 (1992).
294 Långström, supra note 292, at 730.
295 Initially, Austria had expressed reservations regarding Russia’s claim to be a continuation of Soviet
international legal obligations and its membership in international organizations. See Helmut Tichy, Two
Recent Cases of State Succession–an Austrian Perspective, 44 AUSTRIAN J. PUB. & INT’L L. 117, 129 (1992)
(observing that Austria did not explicitly recognize the Russian Federation as the a successor State to the
former Soviet Union, but did welcome it “as an independent and sovereign member of the international
community.”).
296 Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth, supra note 291, at 144.
297 Långström, supra note 292, at 744.
298 George Bunn & John Rhinelander, The Arms Control Obligations of the Former Soviet Union, 33 VA.
J. INT’L L. 323 (1993); see also Långström, supra note 292, at 745
299 See supra Part IV.C.1.
300 1978 Vienna Convention, supra 156, art. 34.
301 AUST, supra note 278, at 377–78.
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territories in 1940.302 These states, therefore, claimed to be merely regaining
their independence after 50 years of occupation.303 Indeed, many pre-Soviet
occupation agreements concluded with Western governments, including the
U.S. and the U.K., were reactivated.304 Russia and the other former Soviet
republics accepted this claim.305 Nonetheless, pragmatism prevailed over
dogmatic doctrine. Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia decided to continue certain
multilateral and bilateral treaties applicable to their territories that were
concluded by the U.S.S.R.306 This led one scholar to observe that “restitutio ad
integrum after more than fifty years of being a part of another state is often
more a legal fiction than a reality,” and to conclude that “[t]he rule enshrined
in article 34(1) is too rigid and does not correspond to international practice. It
therefore cannot be considered a customary norm.”307
The reunification of Germany casts further doubt over the customary status
of the rule of treaty continuity enshrined in Part IV of the 1978 Convention. On
October 3, 1990, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) ceased to exist as
an international legal person when East Berlin and the five constitutive regions
of the GDR became Länder of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).308
Initially, the reunification of Germany appears to be a classic case of the
creation of a new state through the unification of two predecessor states, much
like the creation of the United Arab Republic by the unification of Egypt and
Syria in 1958.309 This, however, is deceiving. Actually, what occurred was the
absorption of the GDR by the FGR.310 In other words, the latter merely
expanded to include the former’s territory, which ceased to enjoy independent
international legal personality.311

302 See generally INETA ZIEMELE, STATE CONTINUITY AND NATIONALITY: THE BALTIC STATES AND
RUSSIA, 17–43 (2005). It is noteworthy that the 1978 Convention takes no clear position on treaties contracted
by an occupying power. Article 40 thereof states: “The provisions of the present Convention shall not prejudge
any question that may arise in regard to a treaty from the military occupation of a territory.” 1978 Vienna
Convention, supra note 156, art. 40; see also ILC Commentaries, supra note 209, at 268.
303 AUST, supra note 278, at 377–78.
304 Id.
305 Id.
306 Id. at 378.
307 Mullerson, supra note 292, at 311, 316.
308 Frans von der Dunk & Peter Kooijmans, The Unification of Germany and International Law, 12 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 510, 550 (1991).
309 See Eugene Cotran, Some Legal Aspects of the Formation of the United Arab Republic and the United
Arab States, 8 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 346, 347 (1959).
310 Jochen Abr. Frowein, Current Developments: The Reunification of Germany, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 152,
157 (1992).
311 ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 363 (2d ed. 2010).
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In theory, Article 31 of the 1978 Convention is the applicable provision to
Germany’s reunification. It states: “When two or more States unite and so form
one successor State, any treaty in force at the date of succession of States in
respect of any of them continues in force in respect of the successor
State. . . .”312 As with the Soviet Union, however, practice painted a drastically
different picture. In what seems to echo the Nyerere Doctrine, Article 12 of the
German Unification Agreement stipulated that agreements contracted by the
GDR “shall be discussed with the contracting parties concerned with a view to
regulating or confirming their continued application, adjustment or expiry. . . .
The united Germany shall determine its position with regard to the adoption of
international treaties of the German Democratic Republic following
consultations with the respective contracting parties . . . .”313 These
discussions, which extended to over 135 States, led to understandings that the
vast majority of the GDR’s treaties lapsed upon unification.314 Meanwhile, the
international legal personality and treaty obligations of the FRG remained
unaffected by its unification with the GDR.315 Instead, the territorial
application of these treaties merely extended to the newly absorbed territory in
what scholars dubbed the “moving-boundary principle.”316
One author explained this departure from the continuity rule by arguing
that it was designed to address the creation of a new international legal
personality out of the merger of two predecessor states.317 Germany’s case, the
argument goes, is distinct because it represents an accession of one state, the
GDR, to another state, the FRG, which maintained its pre-accession legal
personality.318 This is an unpersuasive argument. A fundamental feature of Part
IV of the 1978 Convention is that it applies a single rule of continuity to all

312

1978 Vienna Convention, supra note 156, art. 31.
Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic on the
Establishment of German Unity (Unification Treaty) art. 12, Aug. 31, 1990 30 I.L.M. 463.
314 Frowein, supra note 310, at 159.
315 Id. at 157.
316 AUST, supra note 278, at 374.
317 Frowein, supra note 310, at 158.
318 Id. Another scholar, who was also a West German diplomat, offered a similar view. It is contended
that the FRG had absorbed or incorporated the GDR, which meant that the latter had disappeared as an
international legal person, while the former’s legal personality and existence was unaffected. “The ‘moving
frontier rule’ is in fact a rule of State succession. Since the Federal Republic of Germany remained identical to
itself after reunification there was no State succession with regard to its treaties.” Huber Beemelmans, State
Succession in International Law: Remarks on Recent Theory and State Praxis, 15 B.U. INT’L L.J. 71, 99
(1997).
313
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forms of unifications, separations, and/or secessions.319 The ILC commentaries
on the relevant provisions confirm this:
These articles deal with a succession of States arising from the
uniting in one State of two or more States, which had separate
international personalities at the date of the succession. They cover
the case where one State merges with another State even if the
international personality of the latter continues after they have
320
united.

In short, the reunited Germany disregarded the 1978 Convention as it
determined the fate of treaty obligations inherited from the GDR.
When it comes to state succession to treaties, the unification of Yemen is
the antipode of the unification of Germany. On May 22, 1990, two UN
member states, the Yemen Arab Republic and the People’s Democratic
Republic of Yemen, merged to create the Republic of Yemen.321 Three days
earlier, the foreign ministers of the two predecessor States informed the UN
Secretary General that:
The Republic of Yemen will have single membership in the United
Nations and [will] be bound by the provisions of the Charter. All
treaties and agreements concluded between either the Yemen Arab
Republic or the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen and other
States and international organizations in accordance with
international law which are in force on 22 May 1990 will remain in
effect . . . . As concerns the treaties concluded prior to their union by
the Yemen Arab Republic or the People’s Democratic Republic of
Yemen, the Republic of Yemen (as now united) is accordingly to be
considered as a party to those treaties as from the date when one of
322
these States first became a party to those treaties.

As with Yemen, the principle of the continuity of treaty obligations was
applied in the case of Czechoslovakia.323 On December 31, 1991, the Czech
Republic and Slovakia declared independence and announced that, in
accordance with Article 34 of the 1978 Convention, they were both assuming

319

1978 Vienna Convention, supra note 156, arts. 31–38.
ILC Commentaries, supra note 209, at 253 (emphasis added).
321 See generally Charles Dunbar, The Unification of Yemen: Process, Politics, and Prospects, 46 MIDDLE
E. J. 456 (1992).
322 2 U.N. SECRETARIAT, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL: STATUS
AS AT 1 APRIL 2009, at LII–LIII, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/26, U.N. Sales No. E.09.V.3 (2009).
323 AUST, supra note 278, at 381–82.
320
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the treaty obligations of Czechoslovakia.324 This extended to bilateral and
multilateral treaties and all reservations, declarations, and understandings
lodged by Czechoslovakia to these instruments.325 Also, in accordance with the
1978 Convention, both successor states agreed that treaties solely applicable to
the territory of one of them shall be exclusively binding on that successor
state.326 The only treaties that were reviewed or revisited through consultations
with the relevant treaty partners were those that were contracted with other
Eastern Bloc states that were inapplicable after the collapse of the Berlin Wall
and the end of the Cold War.327
The dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)
challenged the international legal order on many levels, including state
succession to treaties. To examine the legal impact of the breakup of
Yugoslavia, the European Community (EC) established an Arbitration
Commission, known as the Badinter Commission after its chairperson, to
operate under the auspices of the EC Conference on Yugoslavia.328 The first
question examined by the Badinter Commission was the nature of the
unfolding conflict. On November 29, 1991, the commission declared in the
first of fifteen legal opinions that the SFRY was in a process of dissolution.329
In its eighth opinion, issued on July 4, 1992, the Badinter Commission
declared that the SFRY had been completely dissolved, and that it no longer
existed as an international legal person.330 Much like Russia, which had
declared itself to be the extension of the Soviet Union, the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY) argued that it was a continuation of the SFRY and that it
continued to be bound by its treaty obligations.331 This claim was rejected by
the international community.332
324

Id.
Id.
326 See 1978 Vienna Convention, supra note 156, art. 34(1)b.
327 AUST, supra note 278, at 382‒83.
328 STEVE TERRETT, THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE BADINTER ARBITRATION COMMISSION,
119 (2000); see also Marc Weller, Current Developments: The International Response to the Dissolution of
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 569 (1992).
329 Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions Arising from the
Dissolution of Yugoslavia, Jan. 11–July 4, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1488, 1490–91 (1992).
330 Roland Rich, Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 4 EURO. J.
INT’L L. 36, 54 (1993).
331 Zemanek, supra note 287, at 81.
332 On September 19, 1992, the U.N. Security Council adopted resolution 777 in which it declared that:
325

[T]he Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot continue automatically
the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations . . .
[and] that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for
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While the status of the FRY remained a contentious international issue,
especially as it relates to its membership in the U.N.,333 the question of whether
the other States born out of the breakup of the SFRY had succeeded to the
latter’s treaty obligations was comparatively less controversial. Generally,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia operated on the
assumption that the rule of treaty continuity enshrined in Part IV of the 1978
Convention reflected customary international law.334 For example, on July 1,
1992, Slovenia informed the U.N. Secretary General that:
[I]nternational treaties which had been concluded by the SFRY and
which related to the Republic of Slovenia remained effective on its
territory . . . . This decision was taken in consideration of customary
international law and the fact that the Republic of Slovenia, as a
former constituent part of the Yugoslav Federation, had granted its
agreement to the ratification of the international treaties . . . . The
Republic of Slovenia therefore in principle acknowledges the
continuity of treaty rights and obligations under the international
335
treaties concluded by the SFRY. . . .

The other successor States sent similar communications to the U.N.
Secretary-General,336 and informed other governments, including the United
States,337 that they intended to comply with treaty obligations inherited from
the SFRY. For example, in relation to the status of bilateral treaties contracted
with the Czech Republic, the Foreign Ministry of Bosnia-Herzegovina
declared:

membership in the United Nations and that it shall not participate in the work of the General
Assembly . . . .
S.C. Res. 777, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/777 (Sept. 19, 1992).
333 See Yehuda Blum, UN Membership of the “New” Yugoslavia: Continuity or Break?, 86 AM. J. INT’L
L. 830 (1992); see also Vladislav Jovanovic, The Status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United
Nations, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1719 (1997); Carsten Stahn, The Agreement on Succession Issues of the
Former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 379 (2002).
334 Indeed, upon gaining independence, these States deposited instruments of succession to the 1978
Convention. Bosnia succeeded to the convention on July 22, 1993, Croatia on October 22, 1992, and Slovenia
July 6, 1992. See 3 SECRETARIAT, supra note 207, at 541.
335 2 U.N. SECRETARIAT, supra note 322, at XLIX.
336 See id. at V–LIV.
337 For example, in response to a letter from U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, the Bosnian President
affirmed that his government “is ready to fulfill the treaty and other obligations of the former SFRY.” Paul
Williams, The Treaty Obligations of the Successor States of the Former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia: Do They Continue in Force?, 23 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 28 (1994). Likewise, the
President of Croatia wrote to Secretary Baker affirming that “[a]s one of the successors to former Yugoslavia,
the Republic of Croatia is prepared to fulfill treaty and other obligations of the former Yugoslav state.” Id.
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[I]n conformity with the general rules of international law on
succession of States and the provisions of the Vienna Convention on
Succession of States in respect of Treaties, signed on August 23,
1978, considers itself, as a legal successor State of the former
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, bound by bilateral treaties
concluded between former SFRY and the Czech Republic which
were in force on the date of succession of States in respect to the
338
territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

A number of conclusions can be drawn from this overview of state practice
and international reactions to the recent wave of dissolutions, unifications, and
secessions that brought to international life a large number of states. Overall,
the evidence supports the observation of one scholar that the tabula rasa
theory, which was à la mode during the era of decolonization, is no longer
attractive to many states.339 In a comparatively more integrated world, most
new entrants to the family of nations have found the continuation of inherited
treaty obligations beneficial.340
Does this mean that rule of treaty continuation espoused by Part IV of the
1978 Convention, and particularly, for the purposes of this Article, Article 34,
attained the status of customary international law?341 I believe not. Two
elements must be satisfied for a rule to be reflective of custom. First, State
practice in conformity with a rule must be general and uniform, and second,
that practice must emanate from a belief that the rule being followed is legally
obligatory.342 For some observers, international practice associated with recent
cases of State succession and the entry into force of the 1978 Convention has
“breathed some life into certain of its provisions.”343 The cases of
Czechoslovakia, Yemen, and the former Yugoslavia (despite the dispute
aroused by the FRY’s claim to be a continuation of the SFRY) lend support to
this conclusion.344 On the other hand, despite scholarly arguments about its
338 Juan Miguel Ortega Tero, The Bursting of Yugoslavia: An Approach to Practice Regarding State
Succession, in LA SUCCESSION D’ÉTATS: LA CODIFICATION Á L’ ÉPREUVE DES FAITS / STATE SUCCESSION:
CODIFICATION TESTED AGAINST THE FACTS 908 (Pierre Michel Eisemann & Martti Koskenniemi eds., 2000).
339 Zemanek, supra note 287, at 84‒85.
340 Id. at 85.
341 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has recognized that a rule of customary international law may
emerge from the provisions of an international treaty. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969
I.C.J. 4, para. 70 (Feb. 20). In the North Sea Continental Shelf case, the ICJ stated, “[t]here is no doubt that this
process is a perfectly possible one and does from time to time occur: it constitutes indeed one of the
recognized methods by which new rules of customary international law may be formed.” Id.
342 JOHN CURRIE, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 188 (2008).
343 AUST, supra note 278, at 369.
344 Id. at 370, 379–83.
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distinctiveness, the reunification of Germany represents a resounding rejection
of the rule of treaty continuity.345 The political arrangements reached to
accommodate Russia’s continuation of the Soviet Union’s legal personality,
particularly in the area of arms control, seem to situate the dissolution of the
U.S.S.R. in a penumbral middle ground between those cases in which inherited
treaties were upheld and the reunification of Germany.346
What appears, therefore, is a mixed and unsettled record. To be sure, the
claim that treaties expire upon succession has been invalidated.347 It seems
premature, however, to assert that the rule of ipso jure treaty continuity has
been confirmed, and that an indisputable opinio juris has crystallized
supporting the rule’s status as customary international law.348 Indeed, while
many successor states accepted the rule of treaty continuity, as a matter of
principle, political realities necessitated in many instances the termination of
treaties inherited from predecessor states.349 Ranging from the pragmatic
solutions designed to address the fallout caused by the collapse of the Soviet
Union to the impracticability of preserving treaties contracted during the Cold
War, state practice exhibited degrees of flexibility and nuance that are absent
from the “bright-line” rule of treaty continuity enshrined in Part IV of the 1978
Convention.350
The foregoing analysis suggests that the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement has
not devolved onto South Sudan. The predecessor State, Sudan, was not a party
to the 1978 Convention, and its relevant provisions, contained in Part IV,
which adopt a rule of treaty continuity, do not appear to have attained the
status of customary law. A final question that warrants discussion, however, is
whether the nature of the 1959 Agreement per se alters the applicable rules in
this case. In other words, do the rules governing State succession to treaties
distinguish between different classes of treaties, or do they apply in a
nondiscriminatory manner to all treaties regardless of their content? That is the
subject of the next, and final, part of this Article.

345

Id. at 374–75.
Id. at 374–77.
347 Zemanek, supra note 287, at 84–85.
348 Andreas Zimmermann, Secession and the Law of State Succession, in SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL
LAW PERSPECTIVES 214 (Marcelo Kohen ed., 2006); see also Tai-Heng Cheng, Why New States Accept Old
Obligations, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2011).
349 Mullerson, supra note 292, at 310–11.
350 Zimmermann, supra note 348, at 214.
346

HELAL GALLEYSPROOFS2

964

5/1/2014 9:02 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

IV. TERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS, DISPOSITIVE TREATIES, AND STATE
SUCCESSION
The 1959 Nile Waters Agreement regulates the use of an international
watercourse by two riparian states.351 This means that the treaty regulates the
exploitation of resources flowing through the territories of these two states.352
Treaties of this nature, which create obligations of a territorial character, have
received considerable scholarly attention, particularly regarding the impact of
state succession on the validity of these treaties.353 This final Part of the Article
focuses on this category of treaties. In the following pages, juristic and judicial
opinion will be surveyed to determine whether conventional and customary
international law have recognized such a class of treaties, and to identify the
impact of state succession on them.
A. The Genesis of Territorial Obligations and Dispositive Treaties
Jurists have long differentiated between various classes of international
treaties on the basis of the nature of the rights and obligations they create.354
One such distinction is between what has been dubbed ‘personal’ or ‘political’
treaties and ‘dispositive’ or ‘real’ treaties.
The criterion of distinction was that in the one case [personal or
political agreements] the performance of the treaty was a matter of
reciprocal rights and duties of governments in the ordinary exercise
of political discretion, affecting the State as such rather than specified
territory within it, whereas, in the other [dispositive or real
agreements], performance was territorial and not fundamentally
dependent upon the continued jurisdiction in the territory of the
contracting State. In other words, ‘dispositive’ treaties were regarded
355
as in the nature of covenants running with the land.

Lord McNair, a preeminent authority on the law of treaties, concurs and
clarifies that “[o]ne of the consequences of this difference is that the treaties
belonging to this category create, or transfer, or recognize the existence of,

351

2 D.P. O’ CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 246 (1967).
Id.
353 See, e.g., CRAVEN, supra note 164, at 191.
354 Id. at 174; see also Alexander Proelss, Article 34: General Rule Regarding Third States, in THE
VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 630 (Oliver Dorr & Kirsten Schmalenbach
eds., 2012).
355 2 O’CONNELL, supra note 351, at 231.
352
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certain permanent rights, which thereupon acquire or retain an existence and
validity independent of the treaties which created or transferred them.”356
Genealogically, the emergence of this category of treaties is closely
associated with the rise of the nation-State as the principal unit of sociopolitical organization. As jurists and philosophers reimagined the state in a
personified form, it became necessary to adorn this entity with a legal identity
separate and distinct from that of the Sovereign. 357 Recognizing this, Emer de
Vattel proposed in his magnum opus, The Law of Nations, a classification of
treaties that distinguished between ‘personal’ and ‘real’ treaties,358 and
declared that the latter “were intended to subsist independently of the person
who has concluded them, [and] are undoubtedly binding on his successors; and
the obligation which such treaties impose on the state, passes successively to
all her rulers as soon as they assume the public authority.”359
The nature of legal obligations that fall within this category evolved
gradually. Initially, contracts protecting the private rights of nationals in
foreign countries, as opposed to treaties concluded for the benefit of a
monarch, were assumed to constitute dispositive treaties.360 With the advent of
the twentieth century, however, the concept became predicated on a
differentiation between treaties of a political nature, which were considered
personal, and settlements affecting the status of territory, which are classified
as being dispositive treaties.361
Jurists have not unanimously supported the purported existence of these
categories of treaties. Ian Brownlie, for example, expressed misgivings
regarding the theoretical basis for distinguishing between political/personal
and dispositive/real treaties; namely the claim that the former are based on a
political quid pro quo while the latter seek to establish unassailable permanent
rights.362 This, Brownlie argues, ignores the reality that all treaties involve
356

LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 256 (1961).
See generally Alexander Wendt, The State as Person in International Theory, 30 REV. OF INT’L STUD.
289 (2004), for a discussion of the various schools of thought that have personified the State. See also Erik
Ringmar, On the Ontological Status of the State, 2 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 439 (1996)
358 EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 355 (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds., Liberty Fund
2008) (1758).
359 Id. at 359.
360 See id. at 355–60.
361 2 O’CONNELL, supra note 355, at 232‒33.
362 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 508 (1966). Lord McNair proffered
another justification for distinguishing between treaties establishing territorial obligations and other ‘political’
treaties. In his Separate Opinion to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court Justice on the South West
357
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political bargaining and compromise.363 Meanwhile, Erik Castrèn accepted the
existence of obligations of a territorial character, but rejected the claim that the
treaties creating these obligations constituted a distinct category of treaties.364
One cause for scholarly caution in endorsing this concept relates to the
considerable terminological confusion that bedevils the concept of dispositive
treaties.365 The label ‘dispositive treaties’366 has been used as a catchall to
denote a wide variety of legal relations including localized, real, and/or
territorial obligations, objective regimes, servitudes, demilitarization and
neutralization agreements, capitulations, and boundary agreements.367 At
times, these terms have been used interchangeably without much clarity as to
the difference between them.368 Because this is not the place to delimit the
boundaries between each of these legal concepts, suffice it to say that they all
share a basic feature. O’Connell puts it succinctly:
[I]t can be agreed that the fundamental notion underlying the
expression is that a territory is impressed with a status which is
intended to be permanent (or relatively so), and which is independent
of the personality of the State exercising the faculties of
369
sovereignty.

Two conclusions can be gleaned from O’Connell. First, the principal
distinguishing feature of these legal relations is that they are inextricably
territorial in nature.370 It therefore makes sense to use the term ‘territorial
obligations’ to refer to this category of international legal obligations, as
opposed to other terminological options, such as real, localized, or obligations
in rem. Indeed, this term has become employed in modern usage including, as
we shall see below, by the International Court of Justice.371 Second, it is
important to conceptually distinguish between the obligation with which, as

Africa, Judge McNair argued that, in certain cases, treaties are concluded as a settlement that establishes an
objective regime for the collective interest of the community. International Status of South West Africa,
Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 128, at 153 (July 11) (separate opinion of Judge Sir Arnold McNair).
363 BROWNLIE, supra note 362, at 508.
364 CRAVEN, supra note 164, at 180.
365 2 O’CONNELL, supra note 351, at 15.
366 D.P. O’Connell claims that American jurist Westlake invented the term dispositive treaties. Id. at 14.
Lord McNair has criticized this phrase on the grounds that, in French, the term dispositive means the operative
part of a judgment. McNair, supra note 356, at 656.
367 CRAVEN, supra note 164, at 177–78.
368 2 O’CONNELL, supra note 351, at 12–13.
369 Id. at 14.
370 Id.
371 See generally Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).
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O’Connell described it, a territory is “impressed,” and the instrument creating
or codifying that obligation.372 Given that it is commonly used in the literature,
the label dispositive will be used to describe treaties establishing territorial
obligations.373
B. State Succession to Territorial Obligations and Dispositive Treaties
As discussed above, political realities and the necessities of international
life proved the impracticality of purist versions of the two general theories of
state succession. Recognizing this, jurists and policy makers deployed the
categories of territorial obligations and dispositive treaties to mitigate the
disruptive effects of an unqualified application of both theories.374 Thus, the
universal succession approach was blunted by acknowledging that successor
states were not bound by the “personal” treaties of the predecessor state.375
Conversely, proponents of the tabula rasa theory understood that maintaining
a minimum of predictability and stability in international relations required the
devolution of dispositive treaties onto successor states.376
It was against this theoretical backdrop that the ILC examined the impact of
state succession on territorial obligations, a matter that it admitted was at once
“important, complex and controversial.”377 The deliberations of the ILC on this
matter, which, compared to other provisions, elicited unparalleled interest from
U.N. member states,378 ultimately led to the drafting of Articles 11, 12, and 13.
After lengthy discussion during the negotiations over the 1978 Convention, a
fourth provision was added to the repertoire of provisions dealing with
succession to territorial obligations.
372

2 O’CONNELL, supra note 351, at 14–15.
Id. at 14.
374 See ILC Commentaries, supra note 209, at 196–97.
375 Id. at 204.
376 CRAVEN, supra note 164, at 174. The necessity of adapting general theories of State succession to the
realities of international affairs was recognized during the negotiations over the 1978 Convention. For
example, while discussing the question of the impact of a succession of States on international boundaries, the
representative of Ethiopia stated:
373

Clearly, the international community as a whole was against an absolute “clean slate” principle of
State succession. Like any other principle of law, it was subject to exceptions, the most important
of which was contained in article 11 [on boundary regimes]. That exception had been admitted
by most jurists and accepted in State practice.
1 INT’L L. COMM., UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON SUCCESSION OF STATES IN RESPECT
OFFICIAL RECORDS at 116, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.80/16, U.N. Sales No. E.78.V.8 (1978) at 116.
377 ILC Commentaries, supra note 209, at 197.
378 Id. at 206.

OF

TREATIES:
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The first of these, Article 11, “Boundary Regimes,” stipulates that a
succession of states shall not affect “a boundary established by a treaty; or
obligations and rights established by a treaty relating to the regime of a
boundary.”379 Article 12, “Other Territorial Regimes,” prescribes:
1. A succession of States does not as such affect:
(a) obligations relating to the use of any territory, or to restrictions
upon its use, established by a treaty for the benefit of any territory of
a foreign State and considered as attaching to the territories in
question;
(b) rights established by a treaty for the benefit of any territory and
relating to the use, or to restrictions upon the use, of any territory of
a foreign State and considered as attaching to the territories in
question

2. A succession of States does not as such affect:
(a) obligations relating to the use of any territory, or to restrictions
upon its use, established by a treaty for the benefit of a group of
States or of all States and considered as attaching to that territory;
(b) rights established by a treaty for the benefit of a group of States
or of all States and relating to the use of any territory, or to
restrictions upon its use, and considered as attaching to that territory.
3. The provisions of the present article do not apply to treaty
obligations of the predecessor State providing for the establishment
of foreign military bases on the territory to which the succession of
380
States relates.

Article 13, which was added during the negotiations for the 1978
Convention, assured that “nothing in the present Convention shall affect the
principles of international law affirming the permanent sovereignty of every
people and every State over its natural wealth and resources.”381 Finally,
Article 14 confirmed that “[n]othing in the present Convention shall be
considered as prejudging in any respect any question relating to the validity of
a treaty.”382

379
380
381
382

1978 Vienna Convention, supra note 156, art. 11.
1978 Vienna Convention, supra note 156, art. 12.
Id. art. 13.
Id. art. 14.

HELAL GALLEYSPROOFS2

2013]

STATE SUCCESSION TO TERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS

5/1/2014 9:02 AM

969

The general principle applied by these articles is a rule of continuity that
immunizes territorial obligations from the effects of state succession.383 This
applies equally to both newly independent states and states born out of the
uniting or separation of states.384 Article 12 is the most relevant provision for
the purposes of this Article. It is impossible, however, to examine this article in
isolation. The structure and content of this Article were developed in tandem
with Articles 11, 13, and 14 of the 1978 Convention and should be viewed as
part of that package.385
The overwhelming majority of states supported the ILC’s proposal that
international boundaries should be unaffected by state succession.386 As the
representative of the GDR declared: “States had described article 11 as right,
reasonable, balanced and realistic, incontestable, well-established and
universally recognized, or in full harmony with State practice and the general
principles of international law.”387 The principal justification for adopting this
provision was the desire to maintain international peace and security and avoid
the chaos that would ensue should international boundaries be subject to
revision upon succession.388 States from various regions cited resolutions
adopted by the Organization of African Unity and the Non-Aligned Movement,
which together represent a sizable majority of the U.N. member states,
affirming the inviolability of colonial boundaries to evidence that a customary
norm had crystallized to that effect.389 Furthermore, having been adopted less

383

ILC Commentaries, supra note 209, at 169.
See id.
385 The connection between these provisions, especially Articles 11 and 12, is confirmed by the fact that
the ILC Commentaries, which provide the rationale and legal grounding for these provisions, dealt with these
two articles in unison. ILC Commentaries, supra note 209, 196–208.
386 Id. at 199.
387 1 INT’L L. COMM., supra note 211, at 119.
388 For example, the delegate of Ghana expressed support for Article 11 because it “was of overriding
importance for the maintenance of international peace and security.” Id. The delegate of Hungary also stated
that: “article 11 was linked with the need to establish international peace and security.” Id. Similarly, India
affirmed that this provision was “vital to the maintenance of world peace and security . . . and that chaos would
ensue if newly independent States unilaterally repudiated the boundaries they had inherited.” Id. at 121.
389 See id. at 122‒23, for the statement by the Delegation of Kuwait. Delegates from Latin America also
referred to the principle of uti possidetis juris, which emerged in the context of the independence of former
Spanish possessions in Latin America and prescribed that the former administrative boundaries between these
former colonies should become their post-independence borders. See, e.g., id. at 128 for the statement of the
Delegation from Bolivia. The ICJ also confirmed the customary status of this principle in a number of cases,
the most prominent of which was in a boundary dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali. See generally
Frontier Dispute Case (Burk. Faso v. Mali) 1986 I.C.J. 554. See Steven Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti
Possidetis and the Borders of New States, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. (1996); Malcolm Shaw, Peoples Territorialism
and Boundaries, 8 EURO. J. INT’L L. (1997); Malcolm Shaw, The Heritage of States: The Principle of Uti
384
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than a decade earlier, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties had
a palpable impact on discussions regarding Draft Article 11.390 Many
delegations supported the conclusion reached by the ILC that:
The weight of the evidence of State practice and of legal opinion in
favour of the view that in principle a boundary settlement is
unaffected by the occurrence of a succession of States is strong and
powerfully reinforced by the decision of the United Nations
Conference on the Law of Treaties to except from the fundamental
change of circumstances rule a treaty which establishes a
391
boundary.

Despite the chorus of delegations supporting the draft article, a number of
governments expressed skepticism regarding the continuity of international
boundaries inherited from predecessor states. Afghanistan, which had proposed
the deletion of draft Article 11, argued that the proposed text would “have the
effect of prejudging a boundary dispute where one of the parties challenged
colonial or unequal treaties on the basis of the right of self-determination.”392
Somalia concurred with Afghanistan and argued that concretizing colonial
boundaries threatens international peace and security by undermining
“peaceful negotiations for the settlement of boundary disputes inherited from
the colonial past.”393
This is where Article 14 of the 1978 Convention, which appears as Article
13 in the ILC Draft Articles, enters the story. For most States, the ILC had
already foreseen these arguments.394 In recognition of the fact that the defining
feature of boundary agreements is their territorial character, Article 11
prescribes that it is the boundary regime, as opposed to the treaty establishing
that regime, which remains unaffected by State succession.395 As the delegate
of Pakistan explained, “[i]n the context of succession, therefore, the main point
was not so much the continuance in force of a treaty as the continuance of a
territorial situation resulting from the prior implementation of the treaty” that

Possidetis Juris Today, 67 BRIT. YRBK INT’L L. (1996). for academic commentary and consideration of this
principle.
390 See, 1 INT’L L. COMM., supra note 211, at 117, 126–27 for the statements of Ethiopia and Brazil, as
examples.
391 ILC Commentaries, supra note 209, at 201.
392 1 INT’L L. COMM., supra note 376, at 114.
393 Id. at 116.
394 ILC Commentaries, supra note 209, at 207.
395 1978 Vienna Convention, supra note 156, art. 11.
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established the boundary regime.396 Article 14 was inserted to reaffirm this.397
Its effect is to assure successor States that succession did not divest it of the
right to invalidate treaties inherited from their predecessor States.398 In other
words, while succession per se does not provide grounds for renouncing
international boundaries, successor States may challenge these boundaries and
the treaties establishing them through other means provided for in international
law.399 Ultimately, the many supporters of draft Article 11 prevailed, and the
provision was adopted by the wide margin of seventy-one votes to one, with
eight abstentions.400
Draft Article 12, however, was a much more contentious provision. Indeed,
the U.S. representative observed that “article 12 was perhaps the one which
had caused the International Law Commission the greatest difficulties,”401 and
more graphically, the Italian delegate lamented that “[t]here was something
disturbing, if not vaguely nightmarish” about this Article.402 Canvassing the
views of delegations about Draft Article 12 reveals that the concerns expressed
about this provision can be divided into two categories.
First, mirroring earlier debates about Article 11, some countries contended
that the continuity rule enshrined in Draft Article 12 collided with the
principles of self-determination and detracted from the sovereignty of
successor states. Namibia, for example, highlighted that, upon independence,
former colonies found themselves “saddled with treaties to which they had
been neither party nor privy, concluded by the predecessor State with one or
more States, which regulated the use of the territory of the successor State,
thereby denying it the full exercise of its sovereignty.”403 Similarly, Guyana
396

Id. at 118.
ILC Commentaries, supra note 209, at 208.
398 Id.
399 Id. The representative of India during the negotiations over the 1978 Convention confirmed this by
noting that the ILC draft:
397

[P]rovided that a treaty’s validity was not affected by a succession of States; succession could
neither validate nor invalidate a treaty. That was not to say that treaties governing boundaries or
other territorial regimes were immutable; it was generally considered that the International Law
Commission did not intend the two articles [articles 11 and 12] to prejudice the question of
validity of treaties or the right of States to seek a change by lawful means available to them under
international law.
1 INT’L L. COMM., supra note 376, at 121.
400 1 INT’L L. COMM., supra note 376, at 11.
401 2 INT’L L. COMM., supra note 211 at 139.
402 1 INT’L L. COMM., supra note 376 at 142.
403 Id. at 132.
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argued that draft article 12 should be redrafted to ensure that it entailed no
restrictions on the exercise of the right to self-determination, which it posited
had evolved into a peremptory norm of international law.404
Second, considerable apprehension regarding the scope of Draft Article 12
emanated from the ambiguity surrounding the concept of territorial
obligations.405 Much of the debate centered on identifying the forms of treaties,
legal relations, and territorial obligations that this category comprised, and
discussing whether they were equally deserving of being immunized against
state succession.406 The ILC Commentaries were not instructive on this count.
The ILC merely proffered a non-exhaustive illustrative list of these treaties,
including “rights of transit on international waterways or over another State,
the use of international rivers, demilitarization or neutralization of particular
localities.”407
The principal concern expressed by many delegations related to whether
the language of Draft Article 12 was permissive enough to protect treaties
establishing foreign military bases on the territories of successor states.
Immediately upon opening the debate on this draft article, Mexico,408 Cuba,409
and Argentina410 tabled amendments aiming to ensure that “military bases of
the predecessor . . . State party should be excluded from the application of the
provisions of article 12.”411 Despite assurances from major military powers,
such as the US, Britain, and the Soviet Union,412 that draft Article 12 did not
apply to military installations, most delegations insisted on clearly stipulating
that agreements relating to the military presence of a foreign power were
excepted from the continuity rule.413 To assuage the fears of these countries, a
provision that ultimately became paragraph 12(3) of the 1978 Convention was

404

Id. at 139.
As the Yugoslav delegate complained, “article 12 was too general and somewhat unclear, and it might
lead to misunderstandings and other problems.” Id. at 141.
406 See generally 1 INT’L L. COMM., supra note 373, at 140–51.
407 ILC Commentaries, supra note 209, at 197.
408 1 INT’L L. COMM., supra note 376, at 129‒30.
409 Id.
410 Id. at 130–31.
411 Id. at 131.
412 The U.S. delegate confirmed that “article 12 had no connexion with the problem of military bases,”
and the British representative affirmed that “[t]reaties concerning military bases, which were mentioned in the
three amendments, did not come within the scope of article 12, which in no way sanctioned the continuance of
such treaties.” Id. at 136‒37. The Soviet Union adopted that same position. Id. at 145‒46.
413 See id. at 132–34, 141, 145–46 for the statements of Namibia, Côte d’Ivoire, Madagascar, Yugoslavia,
and Iraq as examples.
405
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added to affirm that successor states did not inherit treaties establishing foreign
military bases.414
Another category of territorial obligations that became the subject of
spirited negotiations related to what many delegations labeled servitudes,
particularly when these entailed obligations relating to the use and exploitation
of natural resources.415 Tanzania, and to a lesser extent Kenya, were the most
emphatic in calling for nullifying treaties that limited the unfettered freedom of
a successor state to use natural resources within its territory. Tanzania called
for deleting Draft Article 12, which in its view “attempted to maintain the
inequities arising from colonial situations by creating servitudes.”416 Kenya
adopted a more nuanced position. It suggested rewording the article to
guarantee successor states the right to revisit servitudes inherited from
predecessor states and to reach agreements on the future of these servitudes
that would protect the vital interests of beneficiary states without jeopardizing
the independence of the successor state.417
No other delegations called for deleting Draft Article 12. Rather, many
countries applauded the “wisdom” of the draft article, and emphasized the
importance of protecting certain obligations with which the territory of one
state was impressed for the benefit of either a specific state or the international
community as a whole.418 Examples of these obligations that delegations
pointed to included the use of waterways,419 settlements reached in the interest
of all states,420 and transit rights of landlocked states.421 Speaking in favor of
Draft Article 12, Ethiopia summed up the position of delegations calling for its
inclusion in the final text:

414 The overwhelming support for this proposal became apparent when it was adopted with eighty-four
votes in favor, none against, and one abstention. 2 INT’L L. COMM., supra note 211, at 140.
415 In many instances, the question of the exploitation of natural resources was intertwined with other
forms of legal relations. Thus, Argentina argued that “treaties which conferred specific rights on nationals of a
particular foreign State” should not be considered territorial obligations. 1 INT’L L. COMM., supra note 376 at
131. Similarly, Madagascar associated agreements that relate to the use of natural resources to concessions
granted to foreign countries and companies, and argued that these should not be granted immunity under
Article 12. Id. at 134.
416 Id. at 132.
417 Id. at 135.
418 See id. at 142–46, for the statements of the Federal Republic of Germany, Algeria, Iraq, Denmark, and
Italy expressing their opinion on the importance and wisdom of Article 12.
419 Id. at 136.
420 Id. at 139–40.
421 Id. at 142.
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The provisions of article 12 could affect the vital interests of
countries, particularly in the sphere of rights relating to water,
navigation and transit, which could not be compromised without
endangering peace and security. The article was more particularly
concerned with economic questions, and to delete it might
compromise the economic situation of the States concerned or even
422
“strangle” certain countries.

These delegations also reiterated, as they had during the negotiations over
Draft Article 11, that the continuity rule applies to the territorial obligations
and not to the treaties establishing those obligations.423 Therefore, in a bid to
secure broad-based support for Draft Article 12, a new Article 12 bis, which
ultimately became Article 13 of the 1978 Convention, was drafted.424 This
Article reaffirmed international legal principles guaranteeing the permanent
sovereignty of peoples and states over their natural resources.425 The rationale
for introducing this new provision and how it related to Draft Article 12
becomes apparent from the comments it elicited from the negotiating states.
The delegation of Argentina introduced the provision, and explained that
Articles 11 and 12 represented exceptions to the tabula rasa rule that were
applied to newly independent states.426 Unlike Article 11, which applied to the
specific case of boundary agreements, Draft Article 12, as prepared by the ILC,
appeared overly ambiguous “which would create uncertainty and open the way
for important derogations from the general principle.”427
Nonetheless, the interplay and relation between Articles 12 and 12 bis
remained unclear. Unlike the new Paragraph 12(3), which clearly exempted
foreign military bases from the continuity rule, questions were raised as to the
impact of Article 12 bis on the obligations enshrined in draft article 12.428 The
travaux préparatoires of the 1978 Convention help to demystify the matter.
The predominant opinion during the negotiations was that Article 12 bis served
to reiterate the general principle of the permanent sovereignty of peoples and
states over their natural resources as enshrined in various international

422

Id. at 133.
Id.
424 Given the contentiousness of the topic, the Chairperson of the conference referred Article 12 to an
“informal consultations group” that was entrusted with discussing the amendments submitted on the article and
on reaching a consensus on the text. Id. at 150–51.
425 Id. at 149.
426 Id. at 130.
427 2 INT’L L. COMM., supra note 211, at 132.
428 Id. at 139.
423
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instruments, especially U.N. General Assembly resolution 1803.429 It was
assumed that Article 12 bis would be applied in accordance with the relevant
principles of international law, which were outlined in that resolution.430 Titled
“Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources,” Resolution 1803 pertains to
the relationship between governments and foreign investors involved in the
development and exploitation of natural resources, especially in former
colonies.431 It also outlines the general principles governing the process of
expropriation of foreign capital and the duty to compensate foreign
investors.432
This suggests that Article 12 bis was designed to exclude concessionary
agreements granted by predecessor states to foreign corporations or investors
from the rule of continuity enshrined in Article 12. The fact that servitudes
serving the interests of foreign states were not the target of Article 12 bis is
confirmed by the text of Resolution 1803 itself.433 The declaration states that it
does not “in any way prejudices the position of any Member State on any
aspect of the question of the rights and obligations of successor States and
Governments in respect of property acquired before the accession to complete

429 See id. at 131–34, 137–40, for the statements of Argentina, Ghana, India, Algeria, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, and the United States expressing this opinion.
430 For example, the representative of United Kingdom stated:

While recognizing the existence of that principle, it considered that its application was governed
by the principles of international law, which, in the final analysis, ought to be able to resolve any
possible conflict between the principle of permanent sovereignty and other concepts, such as that
of acquired rights. It was in that sense that his delegation would interpret article 12 bis. Account
should, moreover, be taken of General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII), which contained the
most recent generally recognized description of the concept of the permanent sovereignty of
States over their natural resources and of its relationship to international law.
Id. at 140.
431 G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1803 (Dec. 14, 1962).
432 For example, paragraph 4 of the declaration states:
Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or reasons of public
utility, security or the national interest which are recognized as overriding purely individual or
private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases the owner shall be paid appropriate
compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the State taking such measures in the
exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international law. In any case where the
question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, the national jurisdiction of the State taking
such measures shall be exhausted. However, upon agreement by sovereign States and other
parties concerned, settlement of the dispute should be made through arbitration or international
adjudication.
Id. para. 4.
433 G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1803 (Dec. 14, 1962).
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sovereignty of countries formerly under colonial rule.”434 A number of
delegations reiterated this reading of the Article.435 The representative of
Australia put it concisely:
His country recognized the permanent sovereignty of every State
over its natural resources but considered that a State was also under
an obligation not to prejudice the legitimate interests of neighbouring
State and other States dependant on shared natural resources. The
principles of international law did not confer on States the right to
unrestricted exercise of their permanent sovereignty over their natural
resources. The principles of international law beneficial to
436
neighboring States should be taken into account.

Ultimately, the new Article 13, the new paragraph 3 added to Article 12 on
the non-devolution of agreements establishing military bases, and the text of
Article 12 as drafted by the ILC were all adopted by the negotiating parties by
overwhelming majorities.437
A general observation that can be drawn from this overview of the travaux
préparatoires of the 1978 Convention is that none of the participating
delegations questioned the notion of territorial obligations or doubted the
existence of dispositive treaties as a distinct category of treaties.438 Rather,
what many delegations sought was to reach the appropriate balance between
434 Id. Former Legal Adviser of the U.S. State Department and former ICJ Judge Stephen Schwebel
confirms this in his account of the negotiations over GA resolution 1803:

It was clearly understood that agreements concluded by states other than sovereign states and
property rights acquired under colonial rule were in no way prejudiced by passage of the
resolution. As the delegate of the United States put it in proposing the revised US-UK
amendments: “The text now clearly was without prejudice to any aspect of state succession and
to rights acquired in former colonial territories.”
Stephen Schwebel, The Story of the UN’s Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 49
A.B.A. J. 463, 468 (1963).
435 See 2 INT’L L. COMM., supra note 146, at 137 where Egypt supported this reading of the Article.
436 Id. at 138.
437 Each of these provisions was voted on separately. Id. at 140. Article 12 bis (which became Article 13
of the convention) was adopted by seventy-four votes to none, with twelve abstentions. Id. Article 12(3) was
adopted with eighty-four votes in favor to none, and one abstention, while the whole text of Article 12 was
adopted by eighty-six votes to none with one abstention. Id.
438 For example, Mexico, which led the process to redraft Article 12 admitted that “the continuation of
boundary treaties and other territorial régimes, as laid down in draft Articles 11 and 12, was completely
acceptable in regard to obligations towards other States concerning normal trade, development and
cooperation.” 1 INT’L L. COMM., supra note 376, at 129‒30. Moreover, Yugoslavia, which supported the
Mexican, Argentinean, and Cuban amendments, also affirmed that it “did not question the validity of territorial
régimes which had been recognized by customary international law and the practice of States as being
generally acceptable.” Id. at 141.
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competing legal principles and policy considerations.439 On one side were the
principles of sovereignty, self-determination, and the need to grant states
emerging from colonization a clean slate of treaty relations upon
independence. On the other side were territorial obligations, dispositive
treaties, and the realization that maintaining a degree of order in the relations
among nations required a semblance of predictability. The end result was a
pragmatic and reasonable compromise that, on the one hand protected most
territorial obligations, particularly those established for the benefit of other
states, and on the other hand, allowed for the expiration of obligations that
were most depreciating of national sovereignty, namely foreign military bases
and concessions granted to foreign individuals or corporations.
The test of whether Article 12 of the 1978 Convention attained the status of
a norm of customary international law came in 1997. Hungary and Slovakia
brought a case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to examine the
status of the 1977 Treaty Between the Hungarian Peoples Republic and the
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic Concerning the Construction and Operation
of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros System of Locks.440 One of the questions
examined by the Court was whether Slovakia succeeded Czechoslovakia to the
1977 Treaty.441 Hungary, which requested that the Court find that the treaty
was terminated upon the disappearance of Czechoslovakia, argued, first that
Article 34 of the 1978 Convention was not reflective of customary
international law,442 and, second, that there was no general rule of international
law prescribing automatic succession to bilateral treaties.443 Third, Hungary
maintained that the 1977 Treaty was a joint investment agreement, which
meant that it did not create “rights ‘considered as attaching to [the] territory’
within the meaning of Article 12 of the 1978 Convention, which would, as
such, be unaffected by a succession of States.”444 Implicitly, therefore,
Hungary admitted that Article 12 of the 1978 Convention and the continuity
rule enshrined therein reflected a rule of customary international law.

439

See generally 1 INT’L L. COMM., supra note 376, at 229–32.
See generally Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25). The principal
purpose of the 1977 Treaty had been to facilitate cooperation between the two countries to produce
hydroelectric power and improve navigation in this area of the Danube River. HILAL ELVER, PEACEFUL USES
OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS 227 (2002).
441 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, para. 117 (Sept. 25).
442 Id. para. 119.
443 Id. para.118.
444 Id. para. 119.
440
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On the other hand, Slovakia asserted that it succeeded Czechoslovakia to
the treaty by virtue of Article 34 of the 1978 Convention, which it argued
reflected customary international law.445 Slovakia also opined that
contemporary international practice relating to the dissolution of unions
confirmed that successor States automatically inherited a predecessor state’s
treaty relations.446 In addition, Slovakia confirmed that Article 12 of the 1978
Convention reflected customary international law and described it as:
[A] specific territorial régime which operates in the interest of all
Danube riparian States, and as “a dispositive treaty, creating rights in
rem, independently of the legal personality of its original
signatories.” Here, Slovakia relied on the recognition by the
International Law Commission of the existence of a “special rule”
whereby treaties “intended to establish an objective régime” must be
considered as binding on a successor State. Thus, in Slovakia’s view,
the 1977 Treaty was not one which could have been terminated
447
through the disappearance of one of the original parties.

The Court reached a number of conclusions on these issues, which are of
significance for this Article.448 First, exercising judicial economy,449 the ICJ
declined to opine on the customary status of Article 34 of the 1978
Convention,450 and thus avoided the polarized doctrinal debate over the effects
of State succession, especially in light of contradictory patterns of State
practice.451 Second, the Court disagreed with Hungary on the nature of the
445

Id. para. 121.
Id. para. 120‒21.
447 Id. para. 122 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
448 The judgment of the ICJ in this case also had an impact on many other field of international law,
including the law of treaties, international environmental law, and the law of the non-navigational uses of
international watercourse. See generally, Peter Bekker and Bernard H. Oxman, Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 273, 278 (Apr. 1998); Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Case: The Law of Treaties, 11 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. 321, 321‒22 (1998); Johan
Lammers, The Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Case Seen in Particular From the Perspective of the Law of
International Watercourses and the Protection of the Environment, 11 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 287, 287(1998);
Phoebe Okowa and Malcolm Evans, Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia),
47 INT. & COMP. L Q., 688, 688‒89 (1998); Daniel Reichert-Facilides, Down the Danube: The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties and the Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, 47 INT. &
COMP. L.Q. 837, 838 (1998).
449 Judicial economy has been defined as meaning that the adjudicating body need not “rule on every
single claim made by complaining parties, only on those required to settle the dispute in question.” See Alberto
Alvarez-Jiménez, The WTO Appellate Body’s Exercise of Judicial Economy, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 393, 393
(2009).
450 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, para. 123 (Sept. 25).
451 Jan Klabbers, Cat on a Hot Tin Roof: The World Court, State Succession, and the GabčíkovoNagymaros Case, 11 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 345, 349 (1998).
446
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1977 Treaty.452 While it did include features resembling an investment
agreement, the Court found that the treaty’s object and purpose was to
establish an “integrated and indivisible complex of structures and installations
on specific parts of the respective territories” of the two countries, which
meant that, as Slovakia argued, the treaty established territorial obligations.453
Third, the Court agreed with Slovakia that Article 12 of the 1978 Convention
was reflective of customary international law:
The Court considers that Article 12 reflects a rule of customary
international law; it notes that neither of the Parties disputed this.
Moreover, the [International Law] Commission indicated that treaties
concerning water rights or navigation on rivers are commonly
regarded as candidates for inclusion in the category of territorial
treaties . . . Taking all these factors into account, the Court finds that
the content of the 1977 Treaty indicates that it must be regarded as
establishing a territorial régime within the meaning of Article 12 of
1978 Vienna Convention. It created rights and obligations attaching
to the parts of the Danube to which it relates; thus the Treaty itself
cannot be affected by a succession of States. The Court therefore
concludes that the 1977 Treaty became binding upon Slovakia on 1
454
January 1993.

The World Court also reached a fourth, and slightly perplexing, conclusion.
As discussed above, for the purposes of state succession, the 1978 Convention
differentiated between territorial obligations and treaties establishing those
obligations.455 The language and travaux préparatoires of Articles 12 and 14
clearly immunize the former, not the latter, from expiration upon succession.456
The Court, however, adopted a different view:
The Court observes that Article 12, in providing only, without
reference to the treaty itself, that rights and obligations of a territorial
character established by a treaty are unaffected by a succession of
States, appears to lend support to the position of Hungary rather than
of Slovakia. However the Court concludes that this formulation was
devised rather to take account of the fact that, in many cases, treaties
which had established boundaries or territorial régimes were no

452
453
454
455
456

Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, para. 123 (Sept. 25).
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
1 INT’L L. COMM., supra note 376, at 132–33.
1978 Vienna Convention, supra note 156, arts. 12, 14.
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longer in force. Those that remained in force would nonetheless bind
457
a successor State.

One can only conjecture as to why, despite the unambiguous language of
the 1978 Convention, the ICJ reached this conclusion.458 One possible
explanation is that in some instances, international boundary settlements or
territorial obligations appear in treaties that include many provisions of a nonterritorial nature. The legal regime of the Nile River provides an illustrative
example.459 The agreement of April 15, 1891, between Italy and Great Britain
was aimed primarily at identifying their respective spheres of political
influence in the Horn of Africa.460 Article III of that instrument established a
territorial obligation in the nature of a servitude for the benefit of Egypt.461 The
presence of that single provision does not, however, transform the entire
agreement into a dispositive treaty. Realizing this, the Court could have been
constructing a distinction between treaties, such as the 1977 GabcíkovoNagymaros Treaty, designed to exclusively establish territorial obligations and
which are unaffected by succession, and treaties including multiple forms of
obligations.
This aspect of the judgment aside, it can still be confidently asserted that it
is firmly established in customary international law that territorial obligations
are unaffected by State succession.462 Therefore, it would seem in consonance
with the principles of international law to claim that, upon independence, the
Republic of South Sudan inherited the obligations enshrined in the 1959 Nile
Waters Agreement between Egypt and the Sudan.

457

Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, para. 123 (Sept. 25) (citations
omitted).
458 Jan Klabbers argued that distinguishing between the 1977 Treaty and the territorial regime it
established would have been artificial and unnecessary given the facts of the case. Klabbers, supra note 451, at
354‒55. This does not, however, explain why the Court decided to couch its judgment in general terms.
Klabbers also argues that the Court sought to avoid entering into the doctrinal debate as to whether it was
permissible to distinguish between treaties and obligations enshrined therein. Id. Matthew Craven, on the other
hand, imputes this conclusion to a desire on the part of the Court to avoid reaching an absurd result whereby
Slovakia would have inherited a set of territorial obligations which, in light of the facts of the case, it would
have had to honor with no reciprocal rights incumbent on Hungary. CRAVEN, supra note 164, at 249.
459 See supra Part II.
460 OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, supra note 37, at 127.
461 Id. at 128.
462 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, para. 123 (Sept. 25).
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C. The Scope and Content of Obligations Inherited by South Sudan
While judgments of the World Court command this author’s respect, one
hesitates to conclude that the secession of South Sudan transformed the 1959
Agreement from a bilateral treaty into a multilateral treaty that is binding on
South Sudan. Articles 11, 12, and 14 of the 1978 Convention and their
negotiating history simply do not admit such a conclusion.463 A more prudent
assertion is that South Sudan is bound by the territorial obligations established
by the 1959 Agreement. Identifying these obligations is what this final section
of this Article will undertake.
While the primary purpose of the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement was to
enable Egypt to construct the Aswan High Dam, its overall objective was to
institute a holistic and jointly administered management system for the Nile
waters in Egypt and the Sudan.464 As described in Part Two above, the
agreement comprises eight parts, only the second of which is dedicated to the
construction of the Aswan High Dam in Egypt and the Roseires Dam in the
Sudan. The remainder of the treaty identifies the acquired rights of the two
parties,465 stipulates that further waterworks shall be jointly constructed in
Sudan,466 establishes a permanent technical commission for the joint
management of the river’s resources,467 and recognizes the right of other
riparian States to a share of the Nile waters.468 This bears many resemblances
to the 1977 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Treaty. Both treaties authorized the
construction of major waterworks in two riparian States, created a joint
management system for parts of international watercourses, and included
provisions affecting the interests of third parties.469 In short, like the 1977
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Treaty, the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement established a
territorial regime for the management of the Nile River in Egypt and the
Sudan.470 It is that territorial regime that South Sudan has inherited.
463

See 1978 Vienna Convention, supra note 156, arts. 11–12, 14.
This is confirmed by the language of the preamble of the treaty, which states that the full utilization of
the Nile by both parties requires the implementation of “projects, for [the] full control [of the] river and for
increasing its yield.” 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, supra note 108, pmbl. The preamble also states that the
1929 Agreement had been incomplete because it “provided only for the partial use of the Nile waters and did
not extend to include a complete control of the River waters.” Id.
465 Id. art. I.
466 Id. art. III.
467 Id. art. IV.
468 Id. art. V.
469 Compare 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, supra note 108, with Treaty Concerning the Construction and
Operation of the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros System of Locks, Hung.-Czech., Sept. 16, 1977, 1109 U.N.T.S 235.
470 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, supra note 108.
464

HELAL GALLEYSPROOFS2

982

5/1/2014 9:02 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

To determine the nature and scope of these obligations, guidance can be
sought from the manner in which the ICJ examined the various aspects of the
territorial regime established by the 1977 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Treaty. The
Court noted this regime had multiple objectives:
None of these objectives has been given absolute priority over the
other, in spite of the emphasis which is given in the Treaty to the
construction of a System of Locks for the production of energy. None
of them has lost its importance. In order to achieve these objectives
the parties accepted obligations of conduct, obligations of
471
performance, and obligations of result.

The Court also acknowledged that, since the conclusion of the treaty in
1977, many developments have occurred that altered the factual situation
relating to the river’s management regime.472 Therefore, the Court found that
while the facts on the ground should be taken into consideration, the future
application of the obligations enshrined in the 1977 Treaty should be
undertaken in accordance with the underlying object and purpose of the
treaty.473
The 1959 Nile Waters Agreement is in a similar situation. Since its entry
into force, numerous developments have occurred. Primarily, parts of the treaty
have been implemented. The Aswan High Dam has come into existence and is
functioning.474 Second, some of the conservation projects envisioned in the
agreement, such as the Jonglei Canal, were commenced but remain
uncompleted.475 Third, South Sudan has joined the NBI,476 and the overall
institutional framework managing the Nile’s resources has evolved over the
past decades.477 Fourth, considerable progress has been achieved in areas of the
law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses and
international environmental law, both of which are relevant to the management

471

Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, para. 135 (Sept. 25).
Id. para. 133.
473 Id.
474 See, e.g., Paul Howell, East Africa’s Water Requirements: The Equatorial Nile Project and the Nile
Waters Agreement of 1929. A Brief Historical Review, in THE NILE, supra note 6, at 81, 88.
475 See Paul Howell & Michael Lock, The Control of the Swamps of the Southern Sudan: Drainage
Schemes, Local Efforts, and Environmental Constraints on Remedial Development, in THE NILE supra note 6,
at 243, 243.
476 South Sudan Admitted to the Nile Basin Initiative, NILE BASIN INITIATIVE NEWS. http://www.
nilebasin.org/newsite/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=127%3Asouth-sudanadmited&catid=40%3Alatest-news&Itemid=84&lang=en (last visited Aug. 30, 2013).
477 See supra Part II.
472
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of the Nile River resources.478 These facts cannot be ignored when determining
the scope and content of the obligations South Sudan inherited from the 1959
Agreement.
In light of the above, the territorial regime of the 1959 Nile Waters
Agreement can be divided into two categories. The first includes Part I of the
treaty, which identifies the “acquired rights” of the two parties.479 As discussed
above, this provision was incorporated into the 1959 Agreement from the 1929
Nile Waters Agreement, which has been recognized as a prime example of
dispositive treaties.480 While Egypt’s share of 55.5 bcm should remain
unaffected by the secession of South Sudan, the latter must enter into
negotiations with Sudan to reapportion their respective shares. These
negotiations should be undertaken against the background of, first, the
territorial regime established by the 1959 Agreement, and second, the relevant
customary rules of riparian and environmental law.481
The second category of obligations flowing from the territorial regime
established by the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement relates to future waterworks
and the overall joint management of the watercourse. Article 3 of the
agreement identifies geographic areas that are candidates for water
conservation projects, most of which are now in South Sudan.482 As a
sovereign state, implementing these projects requires the consent of South
Sudan. In accordance with obligations contained in the 1959 Agreement,
however, South Sudan should enter into good faith consultations with its two
partners, Egypt and Sudan to agree on these future waterworks. These
consultations should take into consideration, inter alia, the developmental
needs of South Sudan, projects planned as part of the NBI, and existing
investments and projects. Agreeing on and implementing these projects could
be undertaken through the joint technical commission established by the 1959
Agreement, which South Sudan should be invited to join.483

478

See supra note 448 and accompanying text.
1959 Nile Waters Agreement, supra note 108, art. I.
480 See supra notes 109–15 and accompanying text.
481 See generally STEPHEN MACCAFFREY, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES (2007);
Mohamed S. Helal, Sharing Blue Gold: The 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses Ten Years On, 18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 337 (2007).
482 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, supra note 108, art. 3.
483 This mirrors the findings of the ICJ in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case. Commenting on the exact
obligations of the two parties, the ICJ declined to identify the specific measures that both parties should
undertake to fulfill their treaty obligations and declared that:
479
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In short, the obligation inherited by South Sudan is to become a fullfledged partner in a regime that endeavors to jointly manage, conserve, and
increase the water resources of the Nile River.
CONCLUSION
Most authors try to end academic articles on a positive note. This author,
however, feels that it is unfortunate that this Article had to be written in the
first place. Had the Comprehensive Framework Agreement enjoyed the
unanimous support of the Nile riparians, the impact of South Sudan’s
independence on the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement would have been a moot
point.484 South Sudan would have simply joined its ten co-riparians in a
holistic regime for the collective management of the Nile Basin.
Regrettably, that is not the case. The Nile remains governed by a
fragmented legal regime. Some of the treaties comprising this regime are
anachronisms inherited from the colonial era. While contracted by sovereign
nations, the post-colonial treaties are not much better. Because these
instruments, including the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, were authored in the
mid-twentieth century, they do not take account of recent developments in the
fields of international environmental law and international watercourse law. In
addition, reflecting the prevalent state-centric mentality of the times, the logic
underlying these treaties was a desire to apportion the river’s resources among
distinct and disjointed territorial units. This conception is no longer viable. The
existing institutional and legal regime of the Nile is simply incapable of
meeting the many challenges facing the watercourse and its riparian states.
Rising demand for water, due to development and population growth,
has led to rising water costs, diminishing supplies, and water
pollution. Two hundred fifty million people now live in the Nile
basin, and the population is increasing by a rate of three percent
annually. The population is projected to reach four hundred million

It is not for the Court to determine what shall be the final result of these negotiations to be
concluded by the Parties. It is for the Parties themselves to find an agreed solution that takes
account of the objectives of the Treaty, which must be pursued in a joint and integrated way, as
well as the norms of international environmental law and the principles of the law of international
watercourses. . . What is required in the present case by the rule pact sunt servanda, as reflected
in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention of 1969 on the Law of Treaties, is that the Parties find an
agreed solution within the cooperative context of the Treaty.
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, supra note 440, para. 141‒42.
484 See supra Part. II.

HELAL GALLEYSPROOFS2

2013]

5/1/2014 9:02 AM

STATE SUCCESSION TO TERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS

985

by 2025 and one billion by 2050. In addition to population pressure,
some scientists believe that climate change is reducing the amount of
485
water in the Nile Basin.

The Nile riparians must reimagine themselves as parts of a coherent and
connected drainage basin predicated on a community of interest among these
States. The NBI sought to lay the foundations of this vision, but it remains to
be fully realized. Until then, Egypt, Sudan, and South Sudan will remain bound
by the regime established by the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement.

485

Carroll, supra note 36, at 275 (internal citations omitted).

